



**The American Council for Kosovo**

# **Reconsidering Kosovo**

**Proceedings of the international conference  
held on September 28, 2006 in Washington D.C.**

**Washington D.C. 2006**

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## FOREWORD

One of the most serious but overlooked security issues facing the United States today is the future of the Serbian province of Kosovo and Metohija. Since 1999, Kosovo has been under United Nations administration and NATO military control, with hundreds of U.S. troops still stationed there. As we approach 2007, yet another year in which the “final status” of Kosovo will be supposedly settled, the key question remains open: should Kosovo remain a part of Serbia or – as many believe – should it be detached from Serbia as an independent state?

To initiate the debate on this issue, which has been either one-sided or simply non-existent thus far, the American Council for Kosovo ([www.savekosovo.org](http://www.savekosovo.org)) organized a conference in Washington D.C. on September 28, 2006. This event, held at Washington’s Capital Hill Club, called into question a skewed and unrealistic American policy in this troubled region. The conference was co-sponsored by two other organizations known for their defense of persecuted Christians around the world and for the protection of religious freedoms in the United States, The Religious Freedom Coalition and Christian Solidarity International.

The conference was organized into four panel discussions:

- A report card on Kosovo – Europe’s “Black Hole”;
- Organized Crime, Jihadism and Kosovo’s Impact on the War on Terror;
- Human Rights and Religious Freedom in an Independent “Kosova”; and
- Impact on Regional Stability, International Law, and Other Disputed Regions.

Each of these panels consisted of specialists who have followed events in Kosovo for years and the discussions were informed, insightful, and occasionally hard hitting. The attendance and active participation by the two Christian organizations added a further dimension to the proceedings. Their panelists had recently visited Kosovo and had witnessed on the ground the destruction caused by the organized attempt to destroy any physical evidence of Christian presence in Kosovo. Their presence was an indication that American Christians are beginning to realize what has happened in Kosovo, and the damage done to its Christian heritage. They are also beginning to exert pressure on US politicians, and this offers increased hope that a solution short of outright independence is still possible.

Rep. Trent Franks, a Republican member of the House of Representatives from Arizona, addressed the conference. The Congressman spoke about the crimes committed in Kosovo and the mistaken policies followed there by the Western powers. He pledged his support for a compromise solution to the problem of Kosovo, and promised to do his best to influence his colleagues in the House. His words, followed by a warmly supportive letter sent by Senator Rick Santorum of Pennsylvania, testify to the fact that, on Capitol Hill, the game is not lost.

Our speakers, if not fully in agreement on all points, expressed perspectives that were congruent on the main controversy, the future of Kosovo. For years the American policy community has been fed a steady bill of fare in which the inevitability of Kosovo’s independence with arbitrarily set deadlines was the only conceivable point of view. As one purported expert put it in a recent presentation in Washington, everyone he knows thinks that independence is the only solution for Kosovo – showing, he said, that “great minds think alike.” It shows he needs to get out more and make new friends.

Since the American Council for Kosovo was launched earlier this year, our premise has been a simple one: A policy based on inertia, fear, wishful thinking and fictitious assumptions cannot endure critical examination. Through our website, email distributions, radio and print ads, and good, old-fashioned in-person advocacy, we have begun to chip away at the complacent foundation of falsity upon which America's Kosovo policy has stood during the past 15 years.

Every step of the way we have been presented with innumerable obstacles. It is nevertheless becoming undeniable that more and more Americans are concerned about religious freedom, about Islamic violence against Christians and destruction of churches, about human rights of non-Muslims in majority-Muslim societies, about global security, about drug trafficking, about sex slavery, about organized crime, about the thread of global jihad, about the overstretch of American worldwide commitments, about illegal immigration, about preserving national sovereignty in the face of international bureaucratic malfeasance, in short, about the whole complex of issues that comes together in the Serbian province of Kosovo and Metohija. Those Americans are waking up to the reality that something is terribly wrong, and needs to be fixed.

We present the collection of papers presented at the conference in Washington, and the *Appendix* that contains additional material relevant to understanding the issue before us, in the firm belief that readjustment of America's Kosovo policy is not only possible, but also probable and long overdue.

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## **JIHAD IN THE HEART OF EUROPE**

### **Keynote Address by Bishop ARTEMIJE of Rashka-Prizren**

For far too long America has insisted on Kosovo's path towards independence without realizing, perhaps, that it would condemn my people to extinction. Kosovo independence would lead to the creation of a new rogue state. Can Europe afford to have a Muslim rogue state within its borders during the ongoing, U.S.-led global war against Islamo-fascism? How can the United States and its European allies consider support for an independent Kosovo, when under the nose of the United Nations and NATO Kosovo has become a black hole of corruption and organized crime? Is it to be expected that an independent Kosovo would suddenly end the trafficking of drugs, weapons and slaves, including women and children, when the international community has been unable to end these atrocities for the past seven and a half years?

A European black hole of corruption and organized crime will only enlarge itself if Kosovo is forcibly detached from Serbia. Kosovo's failed and corrupt provisional institutions are already led by Muslim-Albanian former members of the terrorist organization that calls itself the "Kosovo Liberation Army" (KLA). KLA terrorists have close ties to the Albanian mafia, and these ties can only tighten should independence occur.

Do America's leaders really want a new rogue state led by Jihad terrorists and criminals? Kosovo's current so-called prime minister is a man who bears command responsibility for the murders of 669 Serbs and 18 members of other ethnic groups, 518 counts of inflicting serious bodily harm, including torture and wounding, and 584 counts of abduction, many of the victims of which are presumed dead. This same man recently met with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice and posed for pictures with her. Why is this man welcomed in Washington and treated as a legitimate statesman when he has yet to face justice for his war crimes? Is it wise for the United States to meet with a terrorist leader during this war against Islamo-fascism?

Among the characteristic Jihad terror practices of the KLA terrorists is the beheading of victims, as seen in other countries protecting Jihad terror movements. In 1999, soon after the beginning of the international administration in Kosovo, KLA terrorists kidnapped Father Hariton of the Holy Archangels Monastery. His body, showing signs of torture, was found, but not his head. Why are Jihad beheadings an outrage in the rest of the world but not in Kosovo? When photos exist of KLA terrorists, whose identities are known, but who have not been brought to justice, with heads of their Christian Serb victims, why does the international community not push Kosovo leadership for their arrest and as war criminals?

The Jihad in Kosovo was launched in 1995 at the meeting in Tirana between Osama bin Laden and two leaders of the KLA. These two terrorists now regularly meet with Kosovo's so-called prime minister to manage their criminal activities. I have to ask America for an end to this policy of dealing with KLA terrorists, a policy inherited from the past administration. As my country, Serbia, is faced with increasing pressure from these violent terrorists, is it fair to expect the Serbian government to hand over part of its territory to this violent Islamic movement?

This Islamic movement within Kosovo is responsible for a jihad against Christians, which has resulted in 220,000 Serbs and non-Albanians being forced to leave Kosovo since 1999, after the end of the war. In addition, centuries-old churches and monasteries – more than 150 of them – have been destroyed. Every day a violent crime happens in Kosovo and Metohija. Although some would like to turn their back and ignore this unpleasant truth, I bear witness to this violence every day. The Muslim Albanians use violence to eradicate the remaining Serbs and non-Albanians in the hope of creating an Islamic rogue state. Symbols of Christianity are targeted

by Muslim Albanians for destruction with particular zeal. When churches are attacked, particular targets for demonic rage are the crosses on top of the churches and images of our Lord Jesus Christ and His Most Holy Mother. In Kosovo, not even the Christian dead may rest peacefully; Muslim-Albanian desecration of Christian cemeteries is, sadly, an all-too-common occurrence in Kosovo and Metohija. How can the international community ignore religious freedom abuses and eradication of Christianity when considering the forcible detachment of Kosovo from Serbia?

Detaching Kosovo from democratic Serbia, of which it is an integral part, would mean a virtual sentence of extinction for my people in the province and create a new rogue state in which the terrorists are the government. At a time when America is leading the free world in a global struggle against Jihad terror, Kosovo must not continue to be an exception, where for reasons I do not understand, American officials have taken the side of the criminals and jihadists. As America has discovered in the past, appeasing jihadists cannot provide protection from jihad. Neither will sacrificing our land and our blood.

In closing, let me note what I respectfully suggest is your responsibility as Americans: this catastrophe will not happen unless your government insists upon it. It is well known that among the countries in the contact group, the United States – or more properly, the State Department – is pushing the illegal and forcible detachment of Kosovo from democratic Serbia. So today I ask you as Americans: please think how we can convince your government to stop and consider the consequences of what they are doing and change course before it's too late for us, and maybe for you as well.

## **WE REMEMBER AND SUPPORT SERBIA**

### **Congressman Trent Frank (R-AZ)**

President Bush said that democracy is a tool but in the last century we have seen how easily that tool has been abused. We go on to say that democracy is about a civilized people choosing to be governed by civilized people. You and I consider some of the challenge facing Serbia today got to be so unlike the challenges that we face every day in America, that they are very core and that is we must maintain our commitment to our foundational principles and Republican form of government that we have here in America.

I believe the challenges that are faced in Kosovo and Serbia today are critically important to the challenges that the entire world faces and that peace in Serbia is intensively related and linked to the peace in the world. One of the great tragedies is that the rest of the world simply does not understand the circumstances facing Serbia in the world at this moment. Serbia is faced with terrible circumstances regarding their religious freedom. Serbia's population has been victimized and subjected to the growing threat of terrorism that could turn the whole region into a staging ground for terrorism in the world.

In some ways the struggle and the situation in Kosovo is not so different than the struggle Israel has in the Middle East. The challenges are being presented by an entity that is dedicated to wiping out an entire people, and it is animated by the terrorist mindset. I think it is very much the same mindset that faces Serbia today.

One of the things I have tried to do here in Congress is to try to remind people, try to remind the policy makers of the United States, that if Serbia falls to the insurgency of the terrorist domination that it has profound implications for the fight against terror.

More than anything else I suppose I would first offer you an apology and then secondly, a word of encouragement.

I apologize for the way the United Nations has failed to handle the circumstances in Kosovo and Serbia as they should have. It seems that they have forgotten what the real circumstances there are and I don't really have any way to know how to help you understand that that mindset of UN does not reflect the mindset of those who understand your circumstances.

By way of encouragement I would just hope that you all would maintain your courage, that you would understand that the battle you fight is not only about Serbia, its about us, it is about religious freedom, its about humanity itself. And the struggles that you deal with are an example to the whole world. I think that we should take hope for the future.

Across the last two centuries, even though freedom has faced many challenges, it has continue to march across the world. And I believe that ultimately freedom will prevail and I also know this is your hour of great struggle. The world watches you, and I want you to know that there are members of this Congress and people in the United States of America that remember Serbia. You are not forgotten. I believe you will take courage, and God bless you.

## A LONG OVERDUE DEBATE

### Nikolas Gvosdev

It is very important that this conference is being held. What is striking about this issue, and about so many issues of importance to U.S. foreign policy, is the lack of debate and discussion in Washington. We say that the U.S. is the world's leading democracy, it's the world's sole superpower, yet *we don't discuss issues* here. We have a herd mentality where a particular point of view is put forward, and then if you disagree with it, or have alternatives, then you are "unreasonable," or you're dissenting from the truth as it's come down from the mountain.

On the question of Kosovo, it's important for us to put this issue back firmly on the table for debate, for discussion. There are arguments for independence, but there are arguments against independence. You should not rush into anything, you should not have artificial deadlines, you should not paper over the situation simply because it's politically convenient. But it's odd that in London, Paris or Moscow there's an open debate and dialogue about what to do about Kosovo, but you come to Washington and it's not happening at all. It is particularly disturbing to observe that in academia and the media, and especially in some of the hearings that have been held on Kosovo on Capitol Hill, there has not been a fair and balanced presentation of the issues. That does not lead to good policy.

Most people agree that there is a problem in Kosovo. It really reminds me of some of the wonderful Stalinist propaganda of the 1930s, with happy peasants in the field – while in fact a famine is going on. Most people recognize that Kosovo is a center for organized crime, drug trafficking, human trafficking; that the Serbian and other minority populations of the province have no protection; that historical and cultural sites, important not simply to the Orthodox world, but to the heritage of humanity as a whole, have been destroyed or are under threat.

Even people who are supporters of independence for Kosovo acknowledge that this. Frank Carlucci, former Secretary of Defense who is one of them, nonetheless wrote in an essay for the online edition of *The National Interest* that Kosovo is "a dangerous source of drug trafficking, money laundering and other crimes, a 70 percent unemployment rate, a stagnating economy, and the cloud of an uncertain political future create an inflammable mixture."

The debate is not whether Kosovo is currently "doing well" – only a few people, in a spirit of Stalinist "realism" would claim that – but whether or not independence for the province is the best way to solve these problems. When people in Washington make the case for independence, it is interesting that they present this as the only solution to these problems. But we have two case studies from the 1990s where this thesis — separating a province from the larger country and given de facto or de jure independence – has been put to the test, and where problems continued or were even exacerbated.

The peace deal that was reached in 1996 between the Russian government and the Chechen separatists effectively provided for independence. From 1996 until 1999 Chechnya was a de facto independent entity. All of the claims that an independent government would rein in criminal forces, would rein in warlords, would be a source of stability—proved to be untrue. And East Timor was granted independence in 1999 with a great deal of support from the international community, but it is still not clear that that experiment is working out well.

The theory that independence automatically solves all ills is by no means proven. Those who make claims that independence is going to lead to multi-ethnic harmony, to protection for the Serbian population, to a crackdown on trafficking in drugs and the like, should have something more to offer than just blind faith and assurances. They should be able to explain what

gives them the confidence that this will happen if, as we saw in Chechnya, this did not occur; and as we've seen in Timor, independence did not automatically serve to solve a variety of problems, including the creation of a stable government.

We need to be having a much more open and honest debate about any entire spectrum of options. One thing that is very disturbing — a complaint I have heard echoed by various European, Russian and Chinese interlocutors — is the insistence on an “all or nothing” approach: that Kosovo *has to be independent* and it has to be independent *now* is the only option, nothing else can work. That ignores the fact that there's a wide variety of solutions. There is the very interesting precedent in Europe of the Aland Islands, an ethnically Swedish territory in the Baltic Sea that is part of Finland, but has a defined status of autonomy. The Aland Islands were, in essence, the Kosovo of 1919. The Swedes of the island were saying, “Why should we be part of Finland, we want to be part of Sweden or we want to be independent.” An arrangement was made that provided for a high degree of autonomy for the islands, but nonetheless kept them as part of the Finnish state. It proved to be workable, and it proved to be workable even though the majority of the people on the islands initially voted against the settlement. It worked because the international community made very clear that this was the way that things were going to move forward.

It is almost like members of a cult who keep repeating that Kosovo is a unique precedent, has no impact anywhere else in the world. End of discussion. Of course, the rest of the world does not have to accept our assessment of that. Certainly what happens in Kosovo has an impact certainly on all of the frozen conflicts of Greater Europe or the Greater Middle East – however you define it, as consequences for, potentially could be a precedent for the partition of Cyprus. There has already been discussion there, of course, the next deserving candidate for independent status would be the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus, which throws the EU process into a tizzy because the EU has committed itself to recognizing a single Cyprus. This is a great concern to the Chinese, because you have people on the Hill talking about what's good for Kosovo is good for Taiwan – and to my knowledge the President has not sent a personal letter saying that the United States, and all subsequent U.S. administrations, solemnly swear and pledge that a Kosovo precedent will never be applied to Taiwan.

I have to confess, I enjoy watching the intellectual gymnastics on the Hill about why certain people should be independent but others not be independent. You take Kosovo, you take Abkhazia, you take Ossetia, in all three you have autonomous regions, all three of them are comprised of majority populations of a different ethnicity than the majority state, you have had elections and referenda. So why does one deserve independence and the other does not? What people will tell you off the record is, it's a game of good guys and bad guys – if we like you one type of settlement goes your way – if we don't like you another settlement goes a different way.

If that's what happens with Kosovo—that it is based on preferences rather than on standards we are prepared to apply dispassionately and without favoritism, it really will have a negative impact on a lot of these conflicts, because right now it is being very carefully watched. It is being watched by Turkish Cypriot politicians, it's being watched by Kurds in Iraq, who are very interested in how the United States takes a stand on this because it will strengthen their argument for separation from Iraqi state. To wrap up, I think that it's less what the settlement is and more of how it is achieved.

The argument that the international community, NATO, the United States... is powerless to shape things in Kosovo is just simply a way to abdicate responsibility. There are different ways of looking at approaching this problem, other than all or nothing approach. We can have an approach that is based upon true negotiations among all the parties and one that does produce a solution – not a piece of paper to be waved around but one that actually deals with these issues in Kosovo that we have been seeing over the last seven years.

Finally, we need to be thinking about both intended and unintended consequences of policy. Sometimes we see an attitude here in Washington of wanting to move ahead with independence as a way of “washing our hands of this problem”: so what if there are problems there, it is not much of a problem here in the United States. That was our attitude about Afghanistan after 1989, and we discovered that we couldn’t wash our hands that easily of that problem because it came back in a way to haunt us. This attitude that one often hears that this is a little land far away, its fate doesn’t concern us, we can just simply dictate a solution and walk away. That’s not going to happen, and I think in the end a conference like this is very important if it gets more people thinking and discussing about these issues so we can have a real honest debate about our policy.

# KOSOVO REPORT CARD: EUROPE'S BLACK HOLE?

Steven Meyer

A “report card” is intended to provide a comprehensive assessment of how the student is doing in the context of an academic environment. For Kosovo there are three basic interlocking environments, or three increasingly expansive circles, in which we can assess how the disputed province is doing. Let me focus briefly on these three environments-circles, as it is hardly possible to get a good handle on Kosovo’s “report card” without understanding the province in the context of time and space:

1. Kosovo itself
2. Kosovo in context of the broader region
3. Kosovo in the context of Europe and the U.S.

## 1. *Kosovo Conflicts*

Historically, a region of importance because of four powerful, also interlocking issues: (1) conflicting culture/ethnicities; (2) disputed sovereignty; (3) shifting populations; and (4) poverty. These basic conditions remain salient today and conspire to produce a highly inflammatory situation. At this level, the report card is not good at all.

- **First, conflicting cultures/ethnicities** are seen as a zero sum game. At this point in time, Serbs and Kosovar Albanians — both imbued with what they perceive as legitimate claims to Kosovo — evidently cannot live together in the same polity/political order.
- **Second, disputed sovereignty** is also seen as a zero sum game. If anything, this latent and (under Tito) often unspoken assumption has worsened in the post-Tito, post-Milosevic era. As economic conditions worsened, the 1974 constitution provided merely a band aid to mounting ethnic problems. Today, most Serbs will not live under Albanian sovereignty and most Kosovar Albanians will not live under Serb sovereignty. (With expanded UNMIK patrols north of the Ibar River we are seeing Serbs abandon their homes even there, in anticipation.) This issue is complicated, of course, by the presence of small pockets of Serbs and Serb religious and historical sites deeper in Kosovo.
- **Third, shifting populations** — a phenomenon with deep historical roots — corresponds to shifting sovereignties. The rise and fall of Islam and Orthodoxy often corresponded with ebb and flow of Ottoman fortunes in the Balkans. The result was a patchwork of people that has left contemporary Kosovo with the conflicting cultures and disputed sovereignties mentioned above. In the current environment, shifting populations have meant first the attempt by Milosevic to cleanse Kosovo of Albanians and now it means the exodus of Serbs from Kosovo.
- **Fourth, poverty and economic backwardness**—Kosovo always has been among the poorest of the regions of the Balkans. It has never known a time when its economy had not been integrated into a much broader market (something Tito tried to do). By every statistical measure, Kosovo’s economy is in terrible shape: well over 50% unemployment; many living below the poverty line; per capita income at or below \$3,500 per year. These figures are such as they are because, like elsewhere in the Balkans, much of Kosovo’s economy depends on external largesse (and, more importantly, the gray and black economy), but even more so. Kosovo is honeycombed with crime, much of it tied to the political leadership.

## 2. *The Broader region:*

By broader region we mean essentially the former Yugoslavia and Albania. For some purposes (having to do mostly with economics, law enforcement, and security ties) there is a broader Southeast European region. Four basic issues or phenomena characterize the broader region. These are interrelated and cannot be understood apart from each other.

- **First**, the area is politically, economically, and ethnically fractured. Perhaps this is somewhat surprising, given that twice Yugoslavia pulled much of the Western Balkans into a single state. But after the Tito era, both the Western powers and the power brokers inside the Western Balkans could not, or at least did not approach the region in any truly regional sense. Consequently, there are two basic forces that drive the establishment of borders and the construction of political communities (states) in the Western Balkans. One of those is ethnicity, and there is very little positive ethnic interconnectivity. While there has been considerable effort to create interconnectivity in the broader region – the South East European Cooperation Process (SEEC), South East European Cooperative Initiative (SECI), Southeast Europe Defense Ministerial (SEDM), Southeast Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG), and many others – the simple fact that governments in the region are building so many regional organizations is an admission of and compensation for the lack of interconnectivity in the region (aside from crime, of course). In other words, the rush to form literally scores of regional organizations is an overreaction to the lack of strong, substantive interconnection in the area. Furthermore, despite the formation of these regional organizations they have had relatively little impact on the economic, criminal or security situations in the Western Balkans. It is surprising, for example, how little trade there is between and among countries in the Balkans.
- **Second**, economic deprivation. The entire region, not just Kosovo, has very serious economic problems; perhaps this is a blinding flash of the obvious, but it is true. The economies in several of the countries of the Western Balkans have shown good growth, and several Western academics and policy makers have seized upon these growth rates as a sign that Western policies in the region are working: the economies of Bosnia, Serbia, Albania, Croatia all grew in excess of 5% in 2005 and likely will do the same this year. Macedonia is just behind them. This is all to the good. But it is not the entire story, not when one factors in unemployment rates, the percentage of people below the poverty line, current account balances, external debt levels, the ratio of debt to GDP, the percentage of the economy dependent on outside aid and, interestingly, crime and corruption.
- **Third**, political fragility. With the possible exception of Croatia, the political systems of the Western Balkans are quite fragile, and some are unstable. Certainly, important democratic strides have been made throughout the region. But, there are no guarantees--these strides can be reversed, especially if ethnic issues—including Kosovo—is not handled well. Serbia—constitutional question; Macedonia—ethnic issue, etc. Instability—i.e. ethnic on ethnic violence.
- **Fourth**, the drive to “go west,” to follow the money. The West — i.e. the U.S. and northwestern Europe — made it clear that post-Soviet Eastern/Central Europe had only two vehicles to come west, EU for economic issues, NATO for security issues. It is irrelevant whether these organizations serve the national interests of the countries of the Western Balkans. For their part, the countries of the Western Balkans have followed suit, almost like lemmings. They hear the bumper sticker solutions to their problems — the EU and NATO – and expect that joining will act as some sort of silver bullet for the future. Membership in these organizations is anything but a silver bullet, however.

Kosovo, as part of this environment, is engulfed by each of these regional aspects. By and large, they do not bode well for the political, economic, and security future of Kosovo, especially if it is independent. Kosovo needs to be embedded in a regional economy if it is to prosper.

### 3. *Europe and the U.S.*

Ethnicity was one of two powerful forces that have constructed borders and political communities/states in the Balkans. The second is the outside force of Europe and the U.S. — and this is the more important of the two. Of course, there is nothing new about this. Imperial powers have been sitting on the Balkans for centuries, and, as important, defining for the Balkans what modernization is, where borders are placed, and how political communities should be constructed. Normally, the Great Powers have been drawn to the Balkans to serve their own interests, not the interests of the Balkans.

Through the 1990s and in the contemporary environment Western Europe and the U.S. joined in a frequently uneasy Alliance in the Balkans. In somewhat of a twist of history, today, Western Europe and the U.S. are driven by different motivations. Europe is motivated essentially by wanting to keep the Balkans quiet and not have the region drain too many of Western Europe's resources. The U.S. is driven essentially by a desire to get out of the Balkans because, in the view of the Bush administration, it has much more important foreign policy concerns elsewhere—and arguably, those interests are not going well. In that context, of course, Kosovo is the main attraction.

In the minds of many Western policy makers—especially in the U.S.—Kosovo is the last important residual issue from the collapse of Yugoslavia and the Balkan wars of the 1990s. This, in my view, is a dangerous assumption; but it is primarily what drives the Kosovo negotiations in Vienna. Those talks, I think, have been an overwhelming disaster. The underlying rationale has been to deal with so called issue of decentralization and the issues of the protection of historic and religious sites first and wait until these have been resolved to tackle the issue of final status—that is, sovereignty. This approach has led to several major problems:

- Implicit in it is the assumption that sovereignty already has been determined—that Kosovo will become independent under Kosovar Albanian rule and a way must be found to make the few Serbs who remain in Kosovo comfortable with that reality.
- **Questions of decentralization and community development are, in fact, issues of sovereignty. The Serbs have realized that very late in the game.**
- The Contact Group (euphemism for Great Powers, especially the U.S.) has taken the concept of *partition* off the table. Ironically, decentralization is a form of partition—and partition has actually been pursued by the Great Powers in the Balkans in other places when it suits their purposes, including Serbia.
- The atmosphere of the talks now have become so poisoned that—including exchanges of insults between Ahtissari and members of the Serb team—that it is difficult to see how the see talks—which were never negotiations—will be able to yield any positive results. Finally, it is clear that the positions of the Serbs and Kosovar Albanians amount to yet another zero-sum game.

The Serbian position of greatly expanded autonomy (sort of the 1974 constitution on steroids or a variation on the Ottoman millet system) is unacceptable to the Albanians and the Albanian position of full independence (traditional state sovereignty) is unacceptable to the Serbs. In the

context of Great Power control, however, this does not bode well for the Serbs — *the Albanians' strategy is "don't do anything to upset the Great Powers and Kosovo will fall into our laps like a ripe plum."*

These talks, in my view, are exactly reversed of what they should be. Questions of sovereignty and territoriality need to be dealt with first—if the great powers indeed want to be honest brokers; but the policy had been determined well before the talks began.

Finally, Kosovo plays into the broader relationship between Western Europe and the Balkans. This had been especially manifest in suggestions that if the Serbs were forthcoming on Kosovo, they could have an easier path into the EU and perhaps NATO. This is a bit of a siren song. There is no doubt that EU membership in the long run will benefit the economies of the Balkans, but it depends very much on the circumstances of membership and internal EU politics. Those circumstances today are not hospitable to new members, including Turkey, which could have spillover effect in the Balkans. The decisions and promises made in 2003 at the EU meeting in Thessaloniki need to be put in perspective of the reality on the ground. NATO is another question altogether. There is no silver bullet, and no *quid pro quo* on Kosovo.

*(NB: Dr. Meyer's comments are his own, and do not reflect the views of the National Defense University, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government)*

## **KOSOVO AND GLOBAL JIHAD**

### **Walid Phares**

The problem of Kosovo involves not only ethnic and national issues but also international terrorism and the jihadist threat worldwide. In considering Kosovo one has to deal with international relations and law, and the selectiveness in application of statehood criteria and self-determination, but it is impossible to ignore the problem of jihad and how terrorism could be related to the issue of Kosovo and former Yugoslavia.

With regard to the first point that is “self-determination” in Kosovo, the first question – arising from the disintegration or dismemberment of Yugoslavia in the 1990s – is who has, and who does not have, the right for self-determination? In the case of the claim for separation or independence, why was that right not applied within Yugoslavia’s other communities who had a similar claim? It is a valid question for somebody who is not from the region and who has not found yet any answer to that key question; and I am going to be very specific.

In the ‘90’s the majority of citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a federal republic, voted to separate from Yugoslavia based on self-determination. But inside Bosnia there were two ethnic communities that also demanded self-determination *from Bosnia*. That, was the reason for the initial war in Bosnia: A rejection by the Serbs of Bosnian separatism, and rejection by the Muslim-controlled Bosnian government of Serbian and Croatian “separatism” from Bosnia. How come a self-determination claim by Serbians and Croats explicitly in Bosnia was not responded to? Comparatively, similar claim in southern Sudan was not responded to. And yet again claim of Albanian ethnic self-determination from Serbia has been responded to in the late 1990s. This is a very crucial question that we don’t have answers for in the context of the Yugoslav conflict.

The second point is about Kosovo itself. If an ethnic group (whatever the numbers) in that province is claiming separation or ethnic self-determination from Serbia, why can’t a community within that same province demand self-determination as well. And by that I mean, the Serbs. Why is this not applied to both communities? Again, we don’t have an answer for that. Why is it that specific groups or ethnic communities have had an automatic right to self-determination, and another specific group or ethnic community is being denied that right.

Why is it, for example, that the United Nations Security Council, when it comes to Kosovo, the claim for self-determination and separation is seriously considered, but when it comes to Sudan, the claim was not even considered? Was it because the victims in southern Sudan were black?

I am not in a position to discuss the actual validity of the claims and Kosovo in your conference. These are matters you will be discussing, but my question is this: why is it that whenever there is supported by a lobby group at the United Nations, and in the United States, and that is in specific Wahhabi lobby, recognition follows? Whenever there is a Wahhabi claim, that population should separate, you would see immediately that the international community – particularly the economic, the business and then suddenly the political circles – are rushing to accept the claim. But when it is not the

Wahhabi or it is a claim that is rejected by the Wahhabi lobby, then that claim falls down. So this is my first big question, which leads me to my second quickly.

There is an issue linked to terrorism that we need to address. From simple observation we can see that in each case where the Wahabi lobby rushes to support an ethnic claim, a Wahabi Jihad rises up and goes beyond the local autonomy demand: For example in Chechnya, the southern Philippines, Kashmir, and in other areas as well. The link between Wahabi international lobbying for separatism and the rise of Jihadism is too clear. The point hence reverts back to the ethnic claimant: do they want to associate their claim with Jihadism and Wahabism?

These matters have to be addressed before the settlement begins because the international community should make sure that it is not backing a Jihadi Terror force while believing that it is supporting a legitimate movement for self determination. For it is important to make sure that ethnic groups are not hijacked by radicals to separate them from nation-states, only to force them into Jihadi empires: Meaning to move them from one entity on the ground of self determination to force them into a much wider and more dangerous totalitarian entity. These are not answers, these are just two questions and I would be more than happy if this or some future conference would address them.

## KOSOVO AND THE WAR ON TERROR

### Srdja Trifkovic

Why is the Serbian province of Kosovo and Metohija – until two decades ago an obscure corner of the former Yugoslavia – relevant to “the War on Terror”? There are several answers to this increasingly urgent question, all of them valid, but let me start with the one that is often overlooked or unthinkingly discarded as either propagandistic or paranoid: Kosovo is a key link in the Green Corridor, or the Green Transverse, an Islamic belt anchored in Asia Minor and extending north-westward into the heart of Central Europe.

After 9-11, nothing was supposed to be as before, but the U.S. policy in the Balkans has inexplicably retained its Islamophile bias, so remarkably persistent during the Clinton years. In the meantime, the Green Route has morphed from an allegedly paranoid Islamophobic propaganda ploy into a demographic, social and political reality. The absurdity of this *ad hoc* regional alliance between global enemies is demonstrated by its end result, namely the further undermining of the weakest geopolitical link – that in southeastern Europe – in the war on terrorism.

The American curiously benign attitude towards Jihad in the Balkans is not a consequence of ignorance: within the U.S. policy-making community, there is awareness that the Balkans is a part of the front-line, and that those regions in the Balkans where Muslims are in a majority are prime entry points and transit routes for terrorists. And yet, when questioned about the existence and the magnitude of the threat in the Balkans, U.S. policy makers are typically evasive, sometimes aggressively so, as Bishop Artemije has found out on his previous visits to this city. They do not deny the existence of various activities that point to Islamic extremism and terrorist infiltration in the Balkans, but, as a rule, almost immediately relativize it by saying that it is unlikely to undermine the social, political and security balance in the region, or to threaten American vital interests. Then follows the reassuring *mantra* about the supposedly pro-European and pro-“Western” orientation of secularised Balkan Muslims – and the alleged pro-Americanism of Kosovo’s Albanians in particular – with the optimistic conclusion that the accelerated process of the Euro-Atlantic integration of the whole region would narrow the space for radical Islamism until such tendencies will finally disappear.

The problem with such rhetoric – detectable most recently during Donald Rumsfeld’s visit to Tirana on September 26 – is not that it is absolutely wrong, but that it had never been right, and that it becomes less right with each passing year. A majority of the Muslims in the Balkans may still be nominally “pro-Western,” but the question is how they perceive their vocation. Are they likely to remain so if “the West” stops pandering to their demands as a matter of course, and starts judging them on their intrinsic merits?

It may be true that a majority of Kosovo Albanians are 19<sup>th</sup>-century-style nationalists who treat religion as an element of their core identity, but there are a growing number of those who insist that a return to authentic Islam is the key to their national aspirations; and then there are their leaders who have well documented and long-established links with various Islamic terrorist networks. All along, the principal defect of the American approach is in

(1) An unfounded but abiding faith in the attractive powers of secularisation and soft-porn consumerism; and

(2) The cynical expectation that feeding local Muslims with the morsels of Balkan Christendom will keep the global beast at bay. But it is still baffling that a failed paradigm continues to be applied in the Balkans.

On this latter part of the equation in particular, the involvement of the Clinton administration in the wars of Yugoslav succession was an excellent example of the failed expectation that pandering to Muslim ambitions in a secondary theater will improve the U.S. standing in the Muslim world as a whole. That notion matured in the final months of George H.W. Bush's presidency, when his Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger said that a goal in Bosnia was to mollify the Muslim world and to counter any perception of an anti-Muslim bias regarding American policies in Iraq in the period leading up to Gulf War I. The result of years of policies thus inspired is a terrorist base the heart of Europe, a moral and political debacle most visible vis-à-vis Moscow and Peking, and the absence of any positive payoff to America.

The pattern of Washingtonian responses was established in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a microcosm of Yugoslavia itself. When it disintegrated in 1992 into three ethno-religious units, under the pressure of those same centrifugal forces that had been deemed irresistible in Yugoslavia's case, the administration of Bush-father declared that it had to be put together again in the name of *multiethnicity*.

All along it was obvious to any sober Westerner that Muslims did not want a multiethnic liberal democratic society: An astute American military analyst, Col. Sray, warned in 1995 that "President Izetbegovic and his cabal appear to harbor much different private intentions and goals." But the demonization of the Serbs proceeded nevertheless. ... Once the paradigm was successfully planted in Bosnia, the possibilities for Kosovo were limitless. The Albanians were supported in their bid to secede by NATO's military intervention ("self-determination") although that violated the borders of Serbia, but the Krajina Serbs were expelled in the biggest act of post-1945 ethnic cleansing in Europe, rather than allowed to secede from Croatia ("inviolability of borders"). Macedonia was effectively partitioned between Slavs and Albanians in 2001, but no such arrangement is allowed in Kosovo, where under NATO occupation three-quarters of Christians were expelled and over a hundred of their shrines put to torch. While The Hague Tribunal continues its frenzied quest for the remaining two alleged war criminals from Pale, three war criminals *par excellence*, Ceku, Haradinaj, and Thaci, run Kosovo as their criminal little fiefdom with the blessing of the "international community."

The result of Clinton's Balkan policy was the establishment of a vibrant, resilient jihadist base in the heart of Europe. The collusion between Muslim terrorist groups and criminal gangs in the Balkans has also spawned a criminal network with jihadist sympathies that currently supplies Western Europe with tens of thousands of smuggled humans (most of them Muslims) and with the bulk of its top-quality heroin, mostly of Afghan origin. The Interpol and European security agencies know, and occasionally are allowed to warn, that the trade is controlled mainly by Albanian Muslims from Kosovo – with the *mujahedeen* providing the logistics.

The denial of this reality is continuing, as we've seen in that remarkable Clinton interview on September 24. Given to tantrums unworthy of a schoolyard bully, he still pretends that he could "simultaneously be trying to stop a genocide in Kosovo and, you know, make peace in the Middle East, pass a budget." He'll never admit that Kosovo was a serious and perhaps a fatal detraction. In the words of Dimitri Simes, not only is Clinton trying to rewrite history – there was no genocide in Kosovo to justify the NATO attack – but he continues to gloss over the heavy price of his aggression for U.S. national security: thanks to his war America squandered a real chance to get bases in Uzbekistan by cooperating with Russia, and its cooperation with China – another key player in central and south Asia with considerable influence over Afghanistan's neighbor Pakistan – suffered another heavy blow. Concludes Simes, "If Russia and China were in America's corner in 1999 and 2000, the U.S. could have taken action against the Taliban and either driven them from power or at least severed their links to al Qaeda. This would have made the September 11 attacks much more difficult to organize."

The war was ostensibly waged for human rights, but on that front, too, judged by any rational standard, the NATO-UN mission in Kosovo is an unmitigated disaster. Under a string of Euro-Gauleiters (Kouchner, Haekkerup, Steiner, Holkeri, Petersen) the pretense of progress is still maintained, amidst murders, unreversed ethnic cleansing, rampant crime, prostitution, drug-smuggling, and general dysfunctionality of a thoroughly failed, violent, and dysfunctional polity devoid of a single redeeming feature. The former commander of UN forces in Bosnia, Canadian Gen. Lewis McKenzie, knows the score in the Balkans better than any think-tank “expert” in this city. He notes that, back in 1999, “those of us who warned that the West was being sucked in on the side of an extremist, militant, Kosovo-Albanian independence movement were dismissed as appeasers” – while the fact that the KLA was universally designated a terrorist organization and known to be linked to al-Qaeda was conveniently ignored. And yet, the Albanians “have played us like a Stradivarius,” he says. If the Albanians achieve their independence with the help of our tax dollars combined with those of bin Laden and al-Qaeda, McKenzie warns, “just consider the message of encouragement this sends to other terrorist-supported movements around the world.”

It is high time for the realists with no axes to grind in this conflict to resist the curiously undead Clinton model of the new Balkan order – known as “the unfinished business” – that seeks to satisfy the aspirations of all ethnic groups in former Yugoslavia, all, that is, except those of the Serbs. A Carthaginian peace may be imposed on Serbia today, but the Radicals will be in power in Belgrade next year as a consequence, merely contributing to chronic regional imbalance and strife for decades to come. That is not in America’s interest. It is in the interest of Islamists in general and Islamic terrorists in particular, and therefore it should not be condoned.

The short-to-medium-term model for the future of a fully autonomous, but certainly not sovereign, Kosovo and Metohija should be based on the Cyprus precedent; those who lament the “boundary” on the Ibar in Mitrovica should recall that it was acceptable for an ethnically divided Cyprus to join the EU in 2004, and that its de facto ethnic partition into two self-governing entities has been effectively condoned by the UN and the US. The status of Serbian shrines surrounded by the Albanian-controlled territory — Decani, Prizren, Gracanica, Pec etc. — should follow the model of the Vatican, Castel Gandolfo, and St. John in Lateran vis-à-vis Italy. And finally, the status of Kosovo itself vis-à-vis Belgrade should be based on the status of the Åland Islands vis-à-vis Finland. The precedents exist, and the problem of Kosovo is neither so unique nor so intractable as to warrant a solution outside the parameters of established practices in other places where different ethnic and religious communities vie for the same space.

No effective anti-terrorist strategy is possible today without recognizing past mistakes of U.S. policy that have helped breed terrorism. Eight years of the Clinton team’s covert and overt support for the Islamist camp in the Balkans have been a moral disaster and a foreign policy debacle of the first order. Its fruits are visible in the world-wide threat that America faces today. Its chief beneficiaries were the upholders of global Jihad and their co-religionists in Sarajevo, Novi Pazar, Tetovo, Tuzi, and Pristina.

The problem of Islamic terrorism may not be resolved short of a major restructuring of the current Balkan architecture that would entail splitting Bosnia into three ethnically-based cantons, decentralizing Kosovo on the basis of pre-ethnic-cleansing population patterns, and vetoing its independence. The alternative is to create a lawless black hole, centered in Pristina, that would destabilize not only Serbia but also Macedonia and Montenegro, as well as Bosnia-Herzegovina by providing the Republika Srpska with a valid precedent for secession from the Dayton edifice. If the Bush Administration is half-serious about the GWOT, it should

- (1) fire Nicholas Burns and all other bureaucrats left over from the Clinton years who have internalized the Albright view of the Balkans;
- (2) reverse its current support for Bosnia’s centralization, and
- (3) adopt a policy in line with the recommendations of the American Council for Kosovo.

To continue encouraging the global Muslim sense of righteous victimhood partly embodied in the myth of the “genocide” in Kosovo – as Bill Clinton tried doing in his memorable interview with Mike Wallace – is to feed would-be suicide bombers with a political pap that nourishes their hate. If the war on terrorism is to be meaningful, that idiocy must stop. Pandering to Islam’s geopolitical designs — in the Balkans, or anywhere else — is not only bad, it is counterproductive.

A national interest-based foreign policy, freed from claims of American divinely ordained uniqueness, is essential to make the United States victorious in the war on terror. George W. Bush’s belief that “history has called America and our allies to action” is as flawed as Madeleine Albright’s hubristic assertion, “If we have to use force, it is because we are America. We are the indispensable nation. We stand tall. We see further into the future.”

Such millenarian kitsch is both tasteless and dangerous. The notion that “we” are “indispensable” or “on the right side of history” breeds an irrational belief in the correctness of one’s own judgment, and it prompts strategies inimical to the task on hand and to the political and constitutional tradition of the United States. The historicist fallacy that “history” is an entity on a linear march is a gnostic myth worthy of jihadists, nazis and communists, but not of a democratic Republic.

To deal with the terrorist threat effectively and on the basis of leadership willingly accepted by those who are led, the United States should discard the pernicious notion of its exceptionalism. This will be resisted by the advocates of “benevolent global hegemony,” of America’s open-ended and self-justifying world mission and its supposedly *unfinished business* in the Balkans that includes an independent “Kosova,” a centralized Bosnia without the entities, and the unspecified but certainly intended fragmentation of Serbia’s truncated rump [see *Editorial* in this issue]. They need to be confronted, because their mindset and their policies are contrary to the American interest in general, and detrimental to the specific goal of defeating jihad.

The cultural context of that policy needs to be changed, too. The similarity of various Serbophobic rants and the anti-Russian odium over Chechnya, and the vehemence with which they have been deployed by the media and politicians in Western Europe and North America alike, reflects the deeply rooted perception of the Western elite class that nations formed by the spiritual and cultural legacy of Orthodox Christianity belong to an alien and hostile tradition. The vehemence hints that the cause is not in a *misunderstanding* of the East European spiritual tradition but, rather, that such reactions are due to the elite class’s accurate assessment that that tradition is an obstacle to the realization of their political, economic, and cultural preferences in the postmodern world.

As the shadow of global Jihad grows darker, that elite class is following in the footsteps that are 800 years old. When they sacked Constantinople during the Fourth Crusade, the Franks did not understand, or care, that the New Rome on the Bosphorus was the guardian and protector of the West against the same enemy we all face today. The treachery of Orthodoxophobic Westerners opened the way for the Jihadist onslaught against Europe that did not stop until it reached Vienna in 1683.

Replicating the same folly with Serbia today, by condoning the creation of an independent Muslim statelet that embodies everything that America *does not* stand for, brings to mind Talleyrand’s comment on Napoleon’s execution of the Duc d’Enghien: “It is worse than a crime; it is a mistake.”

## A WORD OF ADVICE TO MR. TADIC

### Cliff Kincaid

Occasionally I write about Kosovo, and for that I get regularly denounced and attacked. Most recently I wrote a column, "Clinton's Kosovo Whopper," about his claim during the Chris Wallace Fox News interview that he "stopped the genocide in Kosovo." This is the kind of statement that gets presented in the media and nobody seems to even comment on it, let alone criticize it. It is simply put out there and accepted as fact or even gospel. After my column was posted I started getting threatening e-mails, and it shows what you are up against. The other side is very well organized. A reader took issue with almost everything I said. She wrote, "I hope you know that both Bill Clinton and General Wesley Clark have streets named after them in Kosovo." She even sent along a picture of General Clark in Kosovo near Wesley Clark street – as if this is evidence of what a great job they did and how they are held their high esteem...

By contrast, just yesterday I went on the Serbian Embassy website to see if there was much information about a potential terrorist problem in Kosovo. And you really have to search to find anything, it is a very difficult website to navigate. I put in a call to the Embassy wondering if they had any information on the terrorism problem in Kosovo or the emergence of a jihadist movement there, and I got the run around and was not able to get through to the right person and, eventually, I just hung up.

Now this is a *Washington Post* story that appeared on the 15<sup>th</sup> of this month about a World Bank study on failing nations. It is a World Bank list of failing nations that can breed global terrorism. On the list of fragile states, these failing states, you have got *Kosovo*. According to *The Washington Post*, Kosovo is already a state, which indicates the prevailing media mindset about what is going to happen there. Actually, if you read the study, you will find that the World Bank does not refer to Kosovo as a state, but as a "territory." Nevertheless, it is described in this report and in the article as a breeding ground for terrorists.

About a week or two before that, there were some stories referring to a new study that came out of the International Crisis Group and one of these stories was headlined, "Think Tank Thinks Kosovo Should Have an Army." Considering the nature of the KLA and how it became the Kosovo Protection Corps, it would undoubtedly comprise the majority of any new Kosovo Army – and that is frightening. This particular report came out of the International Crisis Group, whose Board of Trustees includes George Soros, Wesley Clark, Joschka Fisher... But what I find interesting – and this did not get any attention in the press – is that a group that favors Kosovo's independence, and even wants Kosovo to have its own army, admitted on Page 8 of this report that Kosovo is a possible *failing state* and that the situation is deteriorating, while a "growing minority in Kosovo is turning to Wahhabi Islam." These are the kinds of comments or explanations that don't get any follow-up. What would be the ramifications of Kosovo's independence for the global struggle we are now in? The global jihad that's facing us? We can hear some great presentations and read some great books, but where is the Serbian government?

When the Serbian President [Boris Tadic] was here, on the eve of the anniversary of 9/11, I looked at all his public comments and he did not make one public reference to the significance of the status of Kosovo in terms of the global jihad, or the struggle that America is facing. Why shouldn't he have taken some time to go from Washington, where he spent most of his time, up to New York and pay respects to the victims of 9/11 and their families? Instead, it seems that the Serbian government does not even want to focus on the religious dimensions of this conflict. It is like something they don't want to touch and these issues were not reflected in any of the public statements or official statements that he made.

## THE BURDEN OF STATEHOOD: IS KOSOVO READY?

Gregory R. Copley

The international community is being asked whether it should consider recognizing the sovereignty of the Serbian province of Kosovo. But first it is necessary to ask whether Kosovo meets the criteria for sovereignty. Unless it does, the new so-called state would be an artificial entity subsisting on aid from the world community. And — as with all dependent societies — it will merely continue to nurture frustrations and resentment of its benefactors, causing a growing source of criminal and terrorist behavior damaging to its region and to the world.

Some of the major points I make in this regard are that:

1. Kosovo does not meet any historical standards for sovereignty. The territory of Kosovo was seized *for* the present majority of the area only by external powers, and cannot even be defended in the normal sense by the proposed new state itself. Moreover, it is not economically viable except through criminal activities, and has been created solely as a dependent of the international community.

2. For Kosovo to be recognized as a legitimate sovereign state, the international community must violate the sovereignty of another recognized state, the Republic of Serbia, bypassing a variety of treaties, such as the UN Charter and the Helsinki Accords.

3. Kosovo is already a territory run as a criminal enterprise, with links into *jihadist* movements. As a result of this and other factors, Kosovo is not run along lines which have historically been proven to be viable from the standpoint of national management.

There is nothing mystical or pre-ordained about statehood and sovereignty. To be valid and lasting, statehood and sovereignty are conditions which are earned and defended, not dispensed by other, more powerful societies. Even Yasir Arafat said that any state given to the Palestinians by their enemies was a state not worth having.

In my new book, *The Art of Victory: Strategies for Personal Success and Global Survival in a Changing World*<sup>1</sup> I deal specifically with how societies form and prosper. I noted: “Few people today are familiar with many of the countries which existed only, say, 300 years ago. ... Italy did not then exist as a sovereign state; nor did the United States. And more countries will appear or disappear in the next few decades. The wars of secession, and the re-shaping of boundaries, largely suppressed by the Cold War, begin anew. The wars to break up Yugoslavia are still unfinalized. And in many of the new wars we will see savagery abound as groups ‘re-discover’ old identities, and seek to capitalize on the permissive climate of change and chaos.”

In the book I go on to say that in many respects, the “*al-Qaida*” phenomenon owes its success to the financial links with what we are calling the Albanian mafia, just as the Albanian criminals owe their success to the logistics and networks of *al-Qaida*. The chaos of changing borders — such as we are seeing today in the Balkans, and elsewhere — is fertile ground for criminality. In the coming decades there will be more and more “no go” areas in the world. In many respects, the terror has just begun. Criminal states, such as the proposed Kosovo Albanian “state”, will profoundly change the sense of security of all peoples around the world. Already Kosovo is becoming like Afghanistan under the *Taliban*. And like the *Taliban* destruction of the ancient Buddhas of Bamiyan, the Albanian Islamist process of destruction of the Christian Churches will be complete if Kosovo is granted independence, and Western civilization will be gone from a large part of the Balkans. In its place will be a criminal-terrorist state, leaching into the heart of Europe. And it was made feasible by the short-term policies of many European and US politicians of the 1990s.

We are now at a watershed. The world community does *not* have to continue with the errors of the 1990s. It does *not* have to willingly accept — and pay the price in economic and security terms — that Kosovo should be granted the status of a sovereign state. Kosovo does not meet any of the criteria for a modern nation-state, either in terms of the structure developed since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, or of the post-Westphalian structure now emerging. Because of globalization and the free movement of people, ideas, and capital, 21<sup>st</sup> Century statehood will demand, at least, certain conditions of economic and structural sustainability and multi-confessional and multi-cultural composition. Attempts to define sovereignty in terms of the antique tribalism of mono-ethnicity and single belief societies flies in the face of the realities now emerging with a globalized society.

### **Kosovo and Narco-Trafficking**

Kosovo is now the principal center of narco-trafficking for all of Europe, and this has enabled the Albanian mafia to displace other criminal enterprises throughout most of Western Europe, and to expand criminal activities into other, non-narcotic areas. Two points in this regard are important: firstly, the Albanian mafia is essentially what we can loosely call the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), although it now goes by various names; and secondly, the KLA exists, and is able to access much of its narcotic product, because of its close interrelationship with *jihadist* movements and foreign state sponsors. (See *Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis*, October 25, 2005: *Heroin Production Facilities Flourish in Kosovo Area Under US Military Protection*.)

As an example, three major heroin production laboratories, run by the KLA, are operating within the area of Kosovo which has been under the control of US Army units operating from Camp Bondsteel. Ironically, to support the KLA which the former US Clinton Administration had deemed an ally, some US authorities operating in the area specifically protected the laboratories from inspection by other NATO forces in the area. There is also evidence that, over a period of years, US military and possibly intelligence elements have actively engaged in relations with, and protection of, the narco-traffickers.

Since the withdrawal of Serbian control over its Kosovo province, there has been an increasing amount of opium grown in the area, and this is a major supply source for the heroin laboratories, although some raw opium may also be fed into the laboratories from, or via, Turkey (possibly including some raw opium from Afghanistan and Iraqi Kurdistan). The determination of the KLA to defend these facilities is now well-known locally. A Russian unit engaged the KLA in a firefight in the area at night, four years ago, after which the KLA forces were sufficiently strong and well-armed that they surrounded the Russian camp and essentially prevented the Russian forces from leaving their camp.

The KLA's use of Kosovo as a criminal clearing-house extends to a wide range of other activities. Stolen cars from all around Europe, but particularly from Italy, are "re-processed" in Kosovo, and given new papers, before being re-exported to places such as Albania. One such car was used for some time by the Albanian Interior Minister, until a few years ago, before, on a visit to Greece, it was identified because of an Interpol alert, and seized by Greek authorities and taken from the Albanian Interior Minister. As well, electrical goods and household fittings removed from the homes of Kosovo Serbs, who have been driven from the area, are on sale through a major network of retail outlets in Albania. Little of this gains international attention, although the use of roadblocks by the KLA reached such a level that the United Nations and NATO leaderships in Kosovo have issued warnings to their personnel. (See *Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis*, October 20, 2005: *KFOR Claims "Criminals" Active in Western Kosovo; Linked to KLA and Narco-Trafficking*.)

US involvement with the narco-trafficking has gone beyond merely turning a blind eye to the activities of the KLA in the area. US military vehicles, several years ago, were known to have actually transported narcotics from Kosovo, into Western Europe.

### **Kosovo and Jihadist Links**

The International Strategic Studies Association (ISSA) has for some years identified the growing links which the KLA has with the *jihadist* movements which are largely identified under the rubric of *al-Qaida*. It is important to note, however, that labels such as “*al-Qaida*” are misleading. These KLA-*jihadist* links have been well-documented.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, the KLA, and the territory of Kosovo, forms the basis of the territorial link for *jihadists* moving into and out of Europe, seamlessly interacting with *jihadists* in Bosnia, and in the southern Serbian area of Raška, as well as in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), and the newly-independent state of Montenegro, and so on.

Significantly, as we know from a wide range of information, Europe is a major target for the global *jihadist* movements, and not only those under the *al-Qaida* label, but also those financed and logistically made viable by the Iranian Government.

We know that a number of foreign governments support, either directly or indirectly, *jihadist* activities which are based in Kosovo and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. These state sponsors include the Turkish and Iranian governments. Both those governments do so for nationalist reasons or because of corruption, rather than for ideological or religious beliefs. Indeed, even secular officials in Turkey, who are concerned over the rise of Islamism in their own country, support the KLA primarily because of historic links into the Balkan territories and communities which once formed an integral part of the old Ottoman Empire and which still are seen as being within the orbit of pan-Turkism. In this regard, although it is not the primary topic of this presentation, we see a major spread of *jihadist*, criminal, and intelligence activities into FYROM, Montenegro, and these activities are often dependent on the support of the Albanian Government. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is actively engaged in the area, as well, using its old Cold War contacts in Albania.

### **Illicit Weapons Trafficking**

It is axiomatic that narco-trafficking and terrorism are interdependent with the illegal traffic in weapons. We have strong evidence (*iii*), that the entity which we are, for the sake of expediency calling the KLA, is heavily engaged in arms trafficking not only to support its criminal and *jihadist*-linked activities, but also as a profit-center in its own right.

It is significant that international financial controls have meant that the terrorist-criminal movements have been forced to adopt new means of handling and funding their activities, and in organizing their command and control. We’re seeing the use of bartering, or commodities and services exchanges, replacing wire transfers of funds in the financing of acquisition of weapons and explosives throughout Europe, for example. The KLA has been able to operate an illegal weapons exchange with impunity, having the “safe haven” of Kosovo, protected by the international community. The man who has been at the center of this activity has been a second-ranking KLA leader, Niam Behzloulzi, also known as “Houlzi”. That may not be his real name, but we know he carries (or has until recently carried) ID under the name of Niam Behzloulzi.<sup>3</sup>

With regard to the Albania mafia, and the KLA links to criminal activities, you have to look at the official figures from the British Government, the German Government, and so on, to see what they have asserted about Albanian links to narcotic trafficking. Some 80% of narcotics going into the UK is essentially under Albanian Mafia control.

It will do the Albanian people a lot of good if they did not attempt to sweep this under the rug, but rather deal with the criminal problem. Political instability in Italy for decades allowed the Italian Mafia to flourish and to spread internationally, but eventually the Italian Government and people brought the Mafia under control. We saw the same problem occur with the break up of the Soviet Union, unleashing the Russian mafia. The sooner that Albanians themselves assert control over their destiny by removing the criminal elements, the better off they will be.

The question still stands: Why would all of these countries still be interested in giving Kosovo sovereignty if all that I have just said is true? In fact, Kosovo is so far down the food chain that in political life, governments are not prepared to go against the momentum [toward sovereignty] which has the backing of tens of million of dollars of financing. In fact, the U.S. Bush administration and the State Department came to an agreement that they could not change US policy towards the Balkans other than to withdraw US troops as quickly as possible from the area because they had other fish to fry. In fact, [Deputy Secretary of State] Nicholas Burns pushed that the Bush Administration should just continue with the policies in play under Clinton. This was a great victory for the supporters of the Clinton administration, because, due to other distractions, it was too much trouble for the Bush Administration to try to change national policy at this point.

**In Conclusion:** There is ample evidence that Kosovo has no legitimacy in the normal sense of a sovereign state, and that, if it was to be recognized as such, it would further erode the credibility of the international system. Indeed, the United Nations is a body based on the membership of sovereign states, fewer and fewer of which can actually meet the criteria for real sovereignty. The Cold War bi-polar system sustained, for 50 years, many non-viable, so-called “states” within the ambit of the superpowers, but that world is gone, and now we are increasingly seeing “failed states” for what they are.

Kosovo would emerge as a “state” at a time when it can no longer expect the long-term protection of the global system. This will only force it to turn increasingly to the criminal-terrorist enterprises which have been the hallmark of its birth.

Footnotes:

1. Copley, Gregory: *The Art of Victory: Strategies for Personal Success and Global Survival in a Changing World*. New York, 2006: Simon & Schuster’s Threshold Editions. ISBN-13: 978-1-4165-2470-0, or ISBN-10: 1-4165-2470-3.

2. *Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis*, October 25, 2005: *Jihadist Terrorist Leader Returns to the Balkans as Actions Intensify to Promote Kosovo Independence*, and *Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily*, March 19, 2004: *New Kosovo Violence is Start of Predicted 2004 Wave of Islamist Operations: the Strategic Ramifications*, and *Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis*, November 12, 2005: *The Origins and Developments of Modern Islamist Organizations in the Balkans; Links Into Narco-Trafficking*.

3. *Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis*, October 25, 2005: *New Evidence Highlights Albanian Link to Explosives Used in London, Madrid Bombings*.

## **TIME TO REVISE AMERICAN POSITION**

### **Robert Spencer**

The leadership of Serbia seems strangely unwilling to deal with the religious dimensions of the Kosovo conflict, but the problem is not just limited to the Serbian government. This is a global problem, most notably concerning the American leadership and the leadership of the governments of the European Union, who do not seem to have any willingness to deal with the religious dimensions of this conflict. This is leading to an extraordinary and rapidly multiplying number of things that can be termed, as Dr. Trifkovic did, as “worse than a crime.” The war on terror itself is a complete, increasingly misleading misnomer. Terrorism is a tactic, not an enemy. It is something invented by Bin Laden on September 11, 2001, but something that has always been an element of warfare, broadly defined as an attack against innocent civilians in order to weaken and disorganize an enemy so that he no longer has the will to sustain the conflict.

Terrorism has been a part of warfare since the beginning of time. A unified terrorist movement is held with remarkable consistency from Indonesia into Europe and into the Americas, and that is something that is deeply rooted within the Islamic religion. It comes from the Holy Book of Islam, as well as the Islamic traditions and teaching of Muhammad himself. One very small example is that Muhammad, the prophet of Islam, told his followers, “when you meet the unbelievers to invite them to accept Islam. If they accept it, do not fight them. If they refuse, invite them to pay the tax on non-Muslims, specifically levied in Islamic law on Jews and Christians. If they refuse that, if they refuse both the invitation to Islam and the submission to Islamic social order, then the Muslim has to fight them.” So, the three options are conversion, segregation, or war. This is being taken seriously by Muslims today. The President of Iran recently wrote an eighteen page letter to President Bush, which he characterized in an interview in Indonesia as an invitation to Islam.

Yugoslavia was a casualty of the misapprehension on the part of Washington officials to make friends with Muslims and to present themselves as being impartial in matters of religion. They will happily help out Muslims in Kosovo against Serbia, and make sure that they broadcast this as part of a larger initiative to try “to win hearts and minds” among Muslims. This is a delusion: hearts and minds cannot be won in this conflict. The support for Albanian Muslims in Kosovo, on the part of the Clinton Administration, won absolutely nothing for the United States in the Islamic world. The jihad does not proceed according to its stated grievances. Those grievances shift and find forever new ones to be upset about, and to recruit on the basis of. What is constant? The fight against non-believers, in order to either convert them to Islam or to segregate them as inferiors under Islamic rule. That is the reason why they are fighting, and that is the reason why no amount of good will demonstrated by any American administration, is going to win us any lasting friendships in the Islamic world.

That being the case, support for the Islamic side in Kosovo, or anywhere else, is ultimately suicidal for the United States and for the West. It is a mistake to hope that if only we address this grievance or that grievance, or show ourselves to be of sufficient goodwill, that we will turn this around. This stems from a deeply rooted and persistent

misunderstanding of the nature of Islam itself. We can be the most saintly people on the planet, the most moral, the most upright, the most Christian for that matter – nothing would satisfy them, except our conversion or segregation. And this is according to their own statements, their own testimony, not only writings of Muhammad or statements of Muhammad, but statements of Bin Laden, or Izetbegovic, as articulated in 1970 in his *Islamic Declaration*. They all shared the same will for a unified state, governed according to the norms of Islamic law, and stretching through the Islamic world, and pressing out against the non-Islamic world by means of offensive Jihad.

I was speaking at a conference at which were numerous State Department and Homeland Security Officials, and also officials of another government allied with the United States. They all said, unanimously, they wanted to make sure we all understood that this present conflict – the “war on terror” – had nothing to whatsoever with Islam. They claimed that the overwhelming majority of Muslims absolutely opposed jihad activity and terrorist violence. And then, they all spoke about how difficult it was to find Muslim leaders with whom they could work, because whenever they got close to them, they found that they actually did support the jihad. It never dawned on any of them that maybe that is because that is actually a majority view, and quite common, mainstream view within Islam – and not that of a tiny majority of extremists that hijacks the religion. The evidence was right in front of their faces, but the denial nevertheless remained absolute. So, the first thing that needs to be address to save Serbia and to save the situation of the Balkans, in general, and so many other conflicts around the world, is that when the President said "you are either with us or you are against us," he should have said "you are either with the jihadists or you are with us."

There needs to be a very specific and serious reassessment of American positions and the positions of western European governments. They should call upon every state that considers itself, or wants to be considered, an ally to the United States to renounce jihad, to work actively against it, not allow jihad to be propagated in its schools. Unless these and other similar steps are taken, there will be many more repetitions of what we are seeing today in the Balkans.

## **RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN INDEPENDENT “KOSOVA”**

### **The Rev. Dr. Keith Roderick**

It has now been almost three year since the March 2004 pogrom in which 30 Serbian monasteries, churches and at least 900 non-Albanian residences were destroyed or severely damaged. Numerous incidences of violence targeting non-Albanians have occurred on a regular basis. Vandalism continues to plague Serbian cemeteries and religious buildings or symbols.

And yet, a new Law on Freedom of Religion in Kosovo was adopted by the Assembly of Kosovo last July, and promulgated in August by Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General with changes to Article 5.4, which specifies five historical religious communities that will be recognized. The passage of the Law on Religious Freedom satisfies one of the 13 priority laws required to meet standards on human rights laid down by the United Nations Mission to Kosovo (UNMIK). The stated goal of the international community was to establish basic standards under the framework for provisional self-government in Kosovo prior to deciding the final status for the province.

On one hand, adoption of this standard of religious freedom is a positive development. On the other hand, the continued violence and threats of violence targeting non-Albanians in Kosovo undermines confidence that it can be fully implemented. The attacks on returning Serbs and Roma in Kline during this past summer, the most recent, a bomb attack on a Serbian family last week should raise a red-flag signaling to the international community that there must not only be the meeting of international standards in regards to the institutions of self-government, but also a convergence of general social and political will of the people of Kosovo for establishing a peaceful multi-ethnic, multi-religious society.

The Human Rights organization, Forum 18, has reported that a newly-built Catholic church in Smederevo was attacked three times during the past year. It added that Nazarene, Orthodox, Lutheran, Muslim and Mormon sites have also been attacked. Barely 6 % of the 250,000 non-Albanians who fled Kosovo after 1999 have returned. By his own admission the former Special Representative for the UN Secretary-General, Charles Brayshaw, the UN administration of Kosovo failed to provide a secure environment, a precondition for the return of minorities, particularly Serbs. And, it has failed to successfully repatriate Serbs (IDPs) to Kosovo. Again, part of the failure is based on fear to return to an insecure environment.

UN Special Envoy for Kosovo Marti Ahtisaari has shown partiality toward independence by citing arguments the Serbian people bear the collective guilt for the policies of Milosevic. The insecurity of the religious and ethnic minorities is deepened by the suspicions raised by such statements. Targeted violence against non-Albanians, coupled with attitudes of international representatives that reveal partiality or their tacit acceptance of a climate of micro-violence as the cost of solving the Kosovo problem, undermine confidence that religious freedom and human rights will be equitably applied and religious institutions protected in the future.

The Freedom of Religion Law does institutionalize international rights of religious freedom. However, vagueness of the law in regards to who and how religious communities gain legal status is problematic. Establishing general principles to guide the development of law is only one part of the equation; how those principles are implemented and respected under the rule of law is the other. This is the concern that I want to raise in regards to the future of human rights and religious freedom in an independent *Kosova*. Have the attitudes of the majority ethnic and religious majority changed enough toward the minorities to generate the political will necessary to translate the principles delineated by the Freedom of Religion Law into practice?

The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom identified 22 countries (58% of total world Muslim population) of the 44 predominantly Muslim countries that have instituted a constitutional role for Islamic law, principles or jurisprudence. The constitutions of 11 predominantly Muslim countries declare the state to be secular. No declaration either stating a role for Islam or a secular nature for the state has been made for the remaining 11 predominantly Muslim countries. And yet, *there is not one predominantly Muslim country where there exists in practice full equality and religious freedom for non-Muslims*. This is the concern that I want to raise in regards to the future of human rights and religious freedom in an independent Kosovo.

Have the attitudes of the majority ethnic and religious majority changed enough toward the minorities to generate the political will that is necessary to translate the principles delineated by the Freedom of Religion Law into practice? The predominantly Muslim societies in which Christians and others live as minorities must embrace the reality that they can neither be truly free nor democratic until all citizens, whether Muslim or non-Muslim are treated as equals and whose individual rights are secure. When Albanians of Kosovo begin to identify more with their religious legacy as Muslims than their ethnic there will be a dangerous and irreversible shift toward the Islamization of the province. Political power under-girded by religious dogma or the religious orthodoxy of one religion becomes a detriment to the religion of others and erodes individual liberty and rights.

The leadership of the Muslim community in Kosovo governed by the UN will assume a different role in an independent Kosova. The leaders of the majority community are likely to play a greater role in the establishment and structure of a religious governmental ministry. Until there is a transition to governing institutions practicing the rule of law, and away from communal and powerful clan leaders, implementation of the laws protecting religious freedom will be difficult. Efforts to change the Law on Religious Freedom in its draft stage to benefit the Islamic community were argued. Even though these changes were abandoned for the sake of compromise and, many suspect, to move quickly to the status talks, it is clear that these are issues that will reemerge in an independent Kosova, perhaps with more success. Islamic representatives are on record as to their desire to create a separate religion ministry.

The Middle East is an excellent example of this; the Christian population, Arab and non-Arab, has fallen from approximately 20% to 2% since 1900. One of the most startling declines has occurred in Iraq since 2003 where an estimated 30,000 Mandaeans have been reduced to only 4,000 (750%). In an interview for the *Chandigarh Times* of India, the Muslim-born Indian scholar and author of the controversial book, *Islam – “The Arab National Movement”*, Anwar Shaikh, was critical of Islamic revivalists whom, he argued, use Islam as a tool for personal religious and political gain. He noted, “It is totally false to say that Islam is the ambassador of international brotherhood. Islam is based on the doctrine of hating and murdering non-Muslims and reducing them to the status of political slaves.” He cited the fact that Muslims are unable to accept India as their home, apart from the ideas of jihad. India must always be the place of warfare, the *dar al-harb*, where the activity of jihad takes place until India is Islamized.

Shaikh observed that the historical source of the decline of minorities under Islam was rooted in the concept of *jihad*. He notes, “By declaring all Muslims as one nation and the non-Muslims as another, he (the Prophet Mohammed) created the ‘two nation theory,’ perpetually setting Muslims against non-Muslims.” This has been the principle motor force leading to the demise of Christians in the Middle East. The two-world doctrine of *dar al-Islam*, the abode of peace where Islam rules, and *dar al-harb*, the abode of war embraced by Islamists sets in motion religious conflict, chauvinistic attitudes, and supremacist relationships of Muslims toward non-Muslims. The language of *jihad* rather than pluralism; unity by submission rather than mutual respect and co-existence, have had devastating results, not only politically, demographically and culturally on non-Muslim minorities, but also on the mind of the individual who is a minority.

In celebration of the Islamization of the Maldives, the country's president, Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, speaking in Dharubaaruge on July 3, 2000 noted that the country's sovereignty was the result of Islamic homogeneity. He opined that the country would not be able to sustain its independence and sovereignty if other religions were allowed into the country.

The Egyptian-born specialist on the condition of Jews and Christians under Islam, Bat Ye'or, noted in her article entitled, "The Dhimmi Factor in the Exodus of Jews from the Arab Countries," that the Arab/Muslim expansion on predominantly Christian lands in the Middle East was justified by Muslim theologians and jurists in the eighth and ninth centuries. The *jihad*, as a war of conquest, became the legitimate principle that determined the course of future Muslim and non-Muslim relationships. The author observed that, "the religious and legal structure developed by Muslim theologians and jurists, based on the Koran and *hadiths*, elaborated the concept and doctrine of *jihad*. This established the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims in terms of belligerency, hostility, and submissiveness."

The popular Islamic militancy of the last half of the twentieth century is not the root cause of the decline of Christians in the Middle East; it is has enshrined those principles within historic Islam that are the problem, namely *jihad* and Islamic hegemony. The need to assert legitimacy by defining one's movement against what one is not, a *kafir*, or unbeliever, is a powerful force that does not lend itself easily to peaceful co-existence. *Jihad* with its emphasis on the establishment of Islamic hegemony under *Shari'ah* is racist. By its nature it creates a divided society.

The perception of non-Muslims as interlopers is a forceful idea that subtly enters into social/political realities. The term "interloper" infers illegitimacy. Lebanon is a perfect example of how Islamists successfully defended their claim for hegemonic dominance by demonizing the Christians of south Lebanon as outsiders that did not belong or have any legitimate claims to the land. The Islamists were able to aggressively dismantle the non-Muslim enclave and successfully consolidate their occupation of south Lebanon, as well as winning the argument of legitimacy on the world stage.

In Kosovo, the indigenous nature of Serbian culture is being assaulted as part of a process of inferring upon it illegitimacy. Rather than massive Albanian immigration being seen as the root cause of destabilization, Serbs are identified as the interlopers who have created the problem. What follows for the remaining Serbian population of a Muslim dominated Kosovo is *dhimmitude*. Historically, *Dhimmi*s were those "protected people", Jews and Christians, who had been conquered by Islam who submitted to Muslim authority. As long as insecurity and inequality in the application of justice for Serbs in the province exists it is unlikely that there will be a large return of Serbian refugees from Kosovo. The prospect of a decreasing percentage of Serbian population in Kosovo will lead to even greater vulnerability for those who remain.

In order to survive, remaining Serbs will risk loss of identity, abandonment by leaders, and disenfranchisement. Bat Ye'or, who chronicled the decline of Eastern Christianity under Islam argued that territorial imperialism is accompanied by cultural imperialism. She said, "Culture, monopolized by the authorities, becomes an additional instrument of domination and alienation. In fact, the *umma* (the Islamic community) claims a monopoly of culture: the dhimmi languages are banned, relegated to the liturgy; their monuments, testimony to their civilization's greatness are destroyed or Islamized." She notes, that in an environment where the majority's self-identification is religious and where relationships are defined in terms of conqueror-conquered, a dissymmetrical society develops. "It follows that the safety and fundamental rights of the human being are not inalienable rights, but a protection from a hostile environment... this vulnerability annuls the notion of rights and condemns one to exude gratitude for being tolerated," she warns.

This is the dehumanizing condition of dhimmitude that looms in the future for Serbs and others in an Islamized Kosovo.

Two years ago, a delegation in Kosovo of which I was a member found that the leader of the Islamic community, Mufti Naim Ternava, was deceptive in his answers to our questions regarding recent construction of mosques. We were told that all funds to build mosques came from within Kosovo, none from Arab countries. In fact sixty-five percent of the funding came from these sources. He said that they would not accept Saudi money for these institutions, although they would accept it from Islamic charities in Saudi Arabia. He said that there were 27 new mosques in Kosovo, which contradicted UN and US officials who told us many more new mosques than that had by constructed in the Saudi style with a majority funded by Arab sources. Kosovo Islamic leaders note that there are 18 Islamic charities working to support Kosovo Muslims.

Security is an issue that continues to haunt the prospects for the successful implementation of laws providing for freedom of religion. There must continue to be an international instrument to monitor the implementation of individual guarantee of rights and religious freedom. What is worrisome is the escalation of references by Al Qaeda and other radicals of Kosovo as a project of importance to Muslims. It is obvious that there is anticipation that an independent “Kosova” will be a victory for the Islamization of Europe.

Until there is a transition from governing by communal and powerful clan leaders to governing institutions that practice the rule of law equitably, the implementation of the laws protecting religious freedom will be difficult. Efforts to change the Law on Religious Freedom in its draft stage to benefit the Islamic community were abandoned for the sake of compromise and, as many suspect, to move quickly to the status talks. However, it is clear that these are issues that will reemerge in an independent Kosovo, perhaps with more success. Islamic representatives are on record as to their desire to create a separate religion ministry.

In conclusion, security is an issue that continues to haunt the prospects for successful implementation of laws providing for freedom of religion and the creation of a multi-ethnic/multi-confessional society. Individual guarantee of rights and religious freedom must continually be monitored. The escalation of references by Al Qaeda and other radicals to Kosovo as a project vital to their vision of a world ruled by their Islamic principles is worrisome. This anticipation that an independent Kosovo will be a victory for the Islamization of Europe does not bode well for non-Muslims in the province.

In an independent Kosovo, non-Albanians and non-Muslims will no longer have the “protection” of KFOR nor an international caretaker to be an advocate for the rule of law. The forces ordering Kosovo society today will not be those of the future. Does independence move Kosovo closer to a modern, peaceful, and multi-religious society? Or does it open the province to greater chauvinism toward minorities, deprivation of individual liberties, and the destruction of Serbian, Roma, and other cultures? These are the questions that should be answered by the international community as it determines the final status of the province.

## **A TERRORIST-CRIMINAL FIEFDOM**

### **Dr. Wanda Schindley**

Is it possible that Muslim terrorists and their nationalist minions executed 59 attacks (many including several incidents and injuries) in *one day* against the UN, international troops, and UN-trained local police with hardly a whimper in the American media? Yes. It happened on March 17, 2004. In America, late on March 17<sup>th</sup>, Fox News noted in a ticker “ethnic violence” in Kosovo, but the notice was deleted by the next day when 35 more attacks on the UN and soldiers were reported in OSCE documents and 18 more Christian churches were burned. Some mentioning of the “ethnic violence” was reported in buried news stories in major papers with implications that Serb Christians, not Albanian Muslims, were somehow responsible for the violence. The towns above with 2,000-3,000 and 2,000 “demonstrators,” were Prizren and Urosevac, respectively—two areas under the command of Al Qaeda-affiliated Albanian Islamist Samedin Xhezairi (aka Commander Hoxha).

Some 26 (in one area) Kosovo Albanian police changed hats and participated in the attacks against UNMIK and KFOR, destruction of churches, and murder or ethnic cleansing of minorities. After having “sustained findings” of their guilt, the UN removed them from their Kosovo Police Service (KPS) positions. However, they were not prosecuted, and a few months later, they were put back to work even though the UN head of the KPS, Richard Warren, was fully informed about their participation.

A State Department report, requested by Sen. John Cornyn on behalf of two constituents, admitted that 19 people were killed (other reports said 28) and 30 churches were destroyed over three days of violence, but there was no mention of the attacks on the UN or international soldiers. Derek Chappell, a UN spokesperson reported the violence as “organized” and that there was no evidence Serbs had chased Albanian children into a river, the ostensible reason for the violence. The UN response to Chappell’s candid report was *Get him out of here!* He was transferred in a couple of days, and the UN reverted to its No-Truth-Allowed mode.

Tom Gambill, OSCE Security Chief of the Eastern District of Kosovo for five years, was vocal in his briefings about the Islamic terrorist presence in Kosovo, the connections between Islamicists and the Albanian mafia, and the threat to UN and KFOR troops. The UN response was *Get him out of here!* Gambill’s contract was “non-renewed,” and he resigned instead of being transferred for his final two weeks.

Gambill has since become a whistleblower. After articles by *CNS*’s Sherrie Gossett and *Balkananalysis*’s Chris Deliso in which Gambill pointed to evidence that the Albanian mafia “owns” Kosovo and that the UN knew about and supported KLA leaders who participated in murder and ethnic cleansing; allowed Saudi charities that supported Islamic terrorists and even signed a pact with one; ignored the presence of Wahhabi fundamentalists who pay poor Albanians to wear the veil, read the Koran, and attend the mosque to be indoctrinated into jihaders; and turned a blind eye to rampant drug-, weapons-, and sex slave-trafficking.

Another whistleblower, unnamed for now, reported to the UN corruption (money for illegal passage) at a border checkpoint and corruption (wrong remains given to families) in the missing persons division under Jose Pavlos. The UN’s response was *Get him out of here!* His new contract was stopped, and only intervention prevented his repatriation a month or so before the end of his old contract.

Eleven American UNMIK officers, eight of them women, were shot by Jordanians as the Americans left after a tour of a building and walked toward their bus, for which the driver had

disappeared. The UN quickly put a lid on the characterization of the terrorist attack as a terrorist attack. Fox News reported the April, 2004 incident as stemming from an argument between Americans and Jordanians over the war in Iraq—a complete fabrication, based on, assumedly, the UN’s fabrication even though the initial AP report from a UN spokesman did not mention an “argument.” In fact, no words were spoken prior to the ambush from an upper-level balcony.

### **UN and IC Corruption and Complicity with Albanian Mafia**

The UN and the international community (IC) don’t limit the Kosovo cover-up to attacks on internationals and minorities. The billions of taxpayer dollars from Western countries pad many pockets, especially those of the Albanian mafia. Kosovo’s economy is based on “welfare” via corruption and, as characterized by an IMF report, “unrecorded trade” (“black market” in lay terminology).

Some examples of scams from a UN “task force” investigation involve the KPS police budget. An UNMIK polygraph unit succeeded in keeping many terrorists and war criminals out of the KPS for some time. However, the KPS procurement office was moved from police to civilian control by top UN official Richard Warren, circumventing the polygraph “obstacle” and allowing rampant corruption. It works like this: Orders are put out for, say, 1,000 Maglights or computers for the local police officers. The office workers are easily observed taking the orders down and passing them to connected affiliates who then go to the PX or elsewhere and buy all they can of the ordered product and then put in bids for, say, \$350 for Maglights they bought for \$80 or \$2,000 Euros for \$700 desktop computers.

Since there is no accountability, it is possible to put in purchase orders for, say training of officers, with travel, lodging and meals, in Lubljana, Slovenia. The money goes, and there are no receipts or documentation for tuition, registration, travel, lodging, or meals, etc.

Oh, yes. The polygraph unit, when both the examiner and the American contingent commander were on leave, was raided by the KPS (which is, of course, under UN supervision). The equipment and files were taken and, to solve the problem of getting criminals and terrorists past the examiner, the unit was, after almost five years, shut down.

The “task force” was doomed to failure, according to two investigators. The Kosovo Albanians assigned to the Professional Standards Unit (PSU) refused to uphold “sustain findings” based on the evidence. When internationals collected enough evidence to have a corrupt or terrorist KPS officer fired or suspended, the officer simply appealed to an appeals board that was stacked with Albanians. The board reversed the “sustained findings” verdict and, after the reversal was rubber stamped by the UNMIK police commissioner, who was responsible to Richard Warren, the officer was reinstated. So it went with UNMIK’s “task force.” The audit and inventory requested by investigators did not happen. The “sustained” charges against heads of Logistics and Procurement for receiving monies “not spent or turned in, receiving gifts and being wined and dined by vendors and UCK” and against a “Command Staff for ‘fixing’ positions” were reversed, and the convicted were reinstated in their positions.

### **Covering up Terrorist Connections**

While a German contingent marked Serb houses with yellow crosses after they searched Serb farmers’ homes to make sure they didn’t have weapons (to defend themselves against Albanian violence?), the IC has failed to disarm Albanians and even proposes now a Kosovo army.

Yet, intelligence officers have intercepted Stinger missiles going into Kosovo and found terrorists cells, training camps, plans to put a suicide bomber in the mess hall at Camp Bondsteel, weapons in mosques and, most recently, liquid explosives. They know that more weapons and

foreign terrorists come each week to “successful” and “peaceful” Kosovo. They know also that Kosovo is being used to stockpile weapons as a staging post and that more and more Wahhabi Muslims are coming and that more Albanians are converting to Wahhabism. Still, the reality is hidden from the future victims of the jihad, and UN and IC representatives continually deny the Al Qaeda presence and terrorist threat in Kosovo.

(Regarding the liquid explosives, the official report dated August 7, 2006 stated, “After a search at the house of a K-Albanian male . . . items which are in connection to Al Kaida terrorist group were recovered[;] the materials were rapped with Kosovo news papers which were categorized into sub unit affiliated to Osama Bin Laden. . . .” The report was leaked to *Balkananalysis.com*, still without identification of the Al Qaeda-connected “items,” but a source in Kosovo confirmed the items included liquid explosives.)

### **Big Money Scam**

During my visit in Kosovo, I was accompanied by an informed international— not an Albanian who had been trained to tell a “party line,” to explain inconsistencies to visitors with inane “information” such as “the churches are ancient Albanian churches” or “Serbs took the papers to my (stolen) Lamburini” or “Serbs cut off the arms of my little brother and fed his liver to a dog and raped me 25 times.” (The latter is not intended to belittle isolated incidents of rape but to caution, from the Bosnian rape stories, to accept with caution. Women were lined up to testify at The Hague that a man named “Gruban” raped them repeatedly in Bosnia, although there was no description of “Gruban.” As it turns out, “Gruban” was a fictional character used in a joke played on an American Pulitzer-prize-winning journalist, a joke that resulted in a Hague indictment against “Gruban,” actually Gruban Maric, but the journalist couldn’t remember the last name. The indictment was quietly withdrawn after the joke was discovered and *The Boston Globe* ran a story on the illusive Gruban and the strange lack of description.)

Dissonance is unavoidable for the Kosovo visitor. Even Richard Holbrooke must have a hard time reconciling the party line and the reality. Immediately apparent is that almost everything *old* in Kosovo is Serb—the hundreds of 12<sup>th</sup>-14<sup>th</sup> century Christian churches, the traditional European village houses and farm buildings. Likewise, immediately apparent, virtually everything *new* in Kosovo is Albanian—the modern gas stations, restaurants, businesses, and big, multi-story Muslim-style houses, most of which are unfinished and often smack in the middle of a (before the ethnic cleansing) Serb village. My first thought was “Why aren’t the unemployed young people working construction jobs to finish these buildings?”

Silly me. After I returned, I learned from a former UN investigator about the big money construction scam. It works like this:

An Albanian gets a building loan from the Kosovo Trust Fund or other internationally funded agencies to build a house or business. The Albanian buys construction material from the mafia-controlled outlets and starts a building, gets more money to finish the building, sells the remaining construction material to someone else who may or may not finish a building, pockets the money, and abandons the project. The money, a cut of which is rumored to end up in the fund to buy American political support, is gone. But most of the buildings are illegal, built on Serb-owned land, so it’s not a problem that they aren’t finished. So it goes with Kosovo “construction.” Re-construction is another matter. The factories NATO bombed still are not rebuilt. The KosovA power company, already renamed to signify its delivery to a state that does not yet exist, limps along with output a few hours per day in some areas.

More than 50 billion U.S. taxpayer dollars have gone into the black hole of Kosovo, and it has not made life better for a single minority, for the infrastructure, for the production economy to sustain a tax base, or for building a sustainable “democracy.” In fact, it has helped finance

terrorists and has exacerbated nationalistic demands of Kosovo Albanians, who are now under the control of mafia and terrorist forces. Albanians who do not go along with the terrorists meet the same fate as non-Albanians.

Of course, the results of the UN investigation, no matter what was uncovered or where it leads, will be yet another document that will be buried with the ghosts of investigations past. And a cut of the money skimmed under the UN auspices will continue to find its way back into the pockets of Western politicians. The UN knows all about the money trail. A UN document leaked to Gambill traces the money through Kosovo Albanian political leaders, who happen also to be the mafia leaders—so much for “democracy” in Kosovo.

Kosovo has been bought by Albanians with a *lot* of help from their friends. *The Brooklyn Connection* documentary shows Richard Holbrooke and Wesley Clark with Albanian KLA leaders who were writing checks to the Kerry campaign. Florin Krasniqi, the arms dealer who was made a hero on *60 Minutes* even though he openly admitted breaking U.S. laws, explained his willingness to contribute to American politicians: “With money, you can do amazing things in this country,” he says. “Senators and congressmen are looking for donations, and if you raise the money they need for their campaigns, they pay you back.” Hmmm. Krasniqi admits what the public has long suspected: U.S. foreign policy is for sale, and at least some of our politicians are whores (not to slander prostitutes who sell only what is *theirs* to sell).

Holbrooke has had a change of heart about Kosovo since 1998 when he said on *NewsHour with Jim Lehrer*, “[Kosovo Albanians’] goal is an independent Kosovo, their goal is to recreate the Greater Albania that existed briefly during the 30’s and 40’s [under Hitler], which includes Albania, Kosovo, and part of Macedonia. That, I can tell you, Jim, would unravel Southeastern Europe and dramatically increase the chances of a general war. And that’s why the situation is both not the same as Bosnia and why it’s so dangerous.”

Holbrooke now insists on an independent Kosovo, even though he knows full well that the Albanians have not and do not intend to meet the “standards” set by the UN—the “standards” the UN is now willing to throw out the window. But Holbrooke had one thing right: the situation is dangerous. Kosovo Albanians openly threaten UNMIK and KFOR and make clear they now view them as they once did the Serb police—as “occupiers.” When, in the near future, the fruits of the Albanian pay-offs to U.S. politicians come through, Hitler will be one step closer to finally winning World War II and can rest in peace.

### **The “Rebuilding” Joke**

The UN’s message to Albanians: destroy a 14<sup>th</sup> century church and get money to rebuild it. It’s not as though Kosovo Albanians are in need of construction projects. Unfinished Albanian buildings are all over Kosovo. But the money to finish them has already disappeared, so a new scam is needed. So the Albanians demand to rebuild the churches they destroyed, and they have padded the pockets of those in the international community (IC) who will put a rational spin on the insane demands for the *contracts* to rebuild the churches. That does not mean the churches will ever be finished, and if they were, they would certainly be destroyed again. Kosovo Albanians have no intention of allowing the Christian churches to flourish—ever. Now, the UN can pretend the Albanian Muslims are serious about *any* concessions to minorities, *especially* letting them have their churches, but the UN knows better.

Explaining the March 2004 “riots” was somewhat difficult for those who still claim the Serbs are the baddies and the Albanians are the poor, defenseless victims. (Major media, not prepared for *mea culpa*, when they mentioned the carnage at all, cloaked it in the context of “Albanian-Serb ethnic violence.” Politicians had their fingers to their lips and looked for anything they could blame on Serbs. As damage control, there was talk in the IC of rebuilding the 30

churches destroyed in March, 2004. “Talks” began, and the Albanian provisional government set aside money (wonder where *that* originated?) for rebuilding. The money, of course, was donated to them, and it was intended to go into the pockets of mafia through construction materials, etc. Anyone who believes a church will be completed – and that it will be safe from repeat destruction – is grossly uninformed. The UN and IC is not.

The Orthodox clergy was blamed for holding up the reconstruction. They wanted to rebuild their own churches: “Each member lays a stone, and the church is then alive. God is in the church.” It would be reasonable for the Albanians who destroyed another’s property to have to make reparations, to simply pay the church for the damage and let the Christians rebuild. No, it doesn’t work that way in Kosovo. The people who destroyed the property demand to make money on the reconstruction of what they destroyed. One priest was threatened (by a KFOR commander) that if he didn’t go along with letting the Albanians rebuild what they destroyed, “the protection could be withdrawn.” That means death for the priest. But that’s not all.

In addition to the Muslim idea that they can’t share a land area, that they must rule, enslave or kill non-Muslims and tolerate no “infidels,” there is the notion that no church can be higher than a mosque. Well, the ancient Christian churches were often built on hills, and the new mosques are built in the villages to make the villages appear Muslim. So, the ancient churches will not be rebuilt, certainly to the extent that they “live.” The farce of rebuilding the churches is also reflected in the fact that, while there has been a lot of talk about rebuilding the 30 churches destroyed in March, 2004, there has been *no* talk of rebuilding the *more than 100* destroyed or damaged between the time international “protectors” hit the ground in 1999 and, say, February, 2004. (The Orthodox churches are destroyed in three stages—1. burning, 2. dynamiting, 3. razing the rubble—all under the watchful eye of UN/NATO forces.

The violence between Albanian clans and against the minority Serbs, Romas (Gypsies), Jews, Gorani and others in Kosovo over the past six decades has been ignored, apparently characterized as what Richard Holbrooke called it when dealing with the Bosnian Serbs: “historic bullshit,” *To End a War*, p. 148. The “historic bulls--t” to which he refers includes the World War II genocide by fascist Croats and Bosnian Muslims against Christian Serbs, Jews, and Christian or Muslim Roma in which, according to German sources, 750,000 men, women, and children were slaughtered with knives, axes, and mallets.

### **The UN Presides Over Cultural Genocide**

While the violence against Serbs and other minorities was not new to Kosovo, the Serb police had fought to contain the Muslim Albanian violence against Christians and other Muslims (in clan wars or for speaking to Serb neighbors, for instance). The escalation of KLA violence in the 1990s was met with an attempted crackdown by Serb police, who were often killed by snipers and in firefights against terrorists and insurgents who fought on behalf of a Greater Albania. By 1998, the last seminary class of Orthodox priests had to have a military evacuation because of Albanian threats and the kidnapping and torture and beheading (discovered later) of an Orthodox priest. The infamous Racak incident in which Serb police, inviting journalist to accompany them, raided a terrorist stronghold and were subsequently accused of massacring Albanian men, served as a reason to bomb the Serbs to “pre-empt ethnic cleansing,” according to President Clinton.

After the 78-day bombing campaign to destroy the infrastructure in Serbia and its Kosovo province, international forces (KFOR) entered Kosovo, followed by the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). KFOR found that the KLA had already taken control of police departments and had set up road blocks to restrict movement and were kidnapping and killing not only Serbs but also Albanians who refused to be part of the KLA.

But KFOR's mandate was to protect *Albanians* from "ethnic cleansing" and "genocide," and there was little sympathy for the real victims, the minorities. Soldiers and UN contingents were told that the Albanians were the victims, and it was, according to Gambill, members of the third contingent who first started to realize "we bombed the wrong side." In fact, Gambill had been told by one of the earlier departing soldiers to "kill a Serb for me."

After the years of blatant lies from politicians and hired guns who claimed to be journalists as they turned truth on its head, the American public has been so convinced that Serbs are the bad guys and Bosnian Muslims and Croats and Kosovo Albanians are good guys that the very word "Serb" causes mothers to gather their children to their skirts. (See Peter Brock's *Media Cleansing: Dirty Journalism*.) Yet, proof of the opposite is replete. The undeniable results are in: both Bosnia and Kosovo have become strongholds for the terrorists who want to kill Americans and destroy Western civilization. (See Vojin Joksimovich's *Revenge of the Prophet* and Serge Trifkovic's *Defeating Jihad*.) But media is silent on that proof, and we hear from uninformed (or worse) Democrats such as Florida's Sen. Bill Nelson, former congressman Tim Roehmer, and Gen. Wesley Clark (aka The Mad Bomber) about the "success" in Bosnia and Kosovo. Come on, now— "success" for whom? Al Qaeda and other jihadists? Bosnian Muslim fundamentalists and their Arab mujahideen "special forces"? Albanian mafia?

### **Conspiracy Theories**

Anyone who has explored Kosovo in anything except an APC and blinders must ask "Why?" A rational brain demands it. Why does the West want to supplant a Muslim culture over an ancient Christian one, with illegal aliens from Albania who are themselves hostage to a criminal culture at best, and jihad – financed with Saudi oil money – at worst? As rational brains search for answers, conspiracy theories abound. Here's a rundown:

1. Kosovo has resources. Capitalist fatcats such as George Soros, who funds much of the "liberal" agenda, want to buy the resources cheap to make more money, unaware that he can't take it to hell with him. Liberal geniuses can't absorb that, while they espouse hatred of capitalism and pretend to be Marxists (even though they couldn't begin to read him), they are funded by the biggest capitalist pig on Earth. But don't confuse them with facts. They have an (insane) agenda and will protest in the rain for their funder (Soros) and a free joint.

2. Western Europeans who accepted hundreds of thousands of Albanian Muslims to do their dirty work have found that most of their crime is perpetrated by Albanians. They didn't understand the culture and screwed up miserably in accepting so many of them who had Yugoslav passports and *could* have been civilized; and now they want to get rid of them. So, they are shipping them back by the thousands, and think they can make them more eager to leave for an independent Kosovo.

3. The Vatican has an uneasy relationship with Orthodox Christians for 1,000 years, and has fought numerous wars and backed subversive activities worldwide in the interest of suppressing Orthodox Christians who refuse to submit to its supremacy. Historically, Serbs have been the "Guardians at the Gate" against Muslim conquerors, and historically the Vatican has used Muslims to fight against Orthodox Christians during the atrocious genocide against Serbs, Jews, and Romas during WWII.

4. The West wants to show the Muslim world that the West really cares about Muslims (hence, the sacrifice of majority-Christian Bosnia to Muslims) and, therefore, deserves cheap oil. While the political and media chorus does not understand Islam, they are sure that nothing bad will happen. These people do not care about their children's future. They look in the mirror and see the most important person in the world. They have learned the lesson of capitalism

and succumbed to Lenin's assessment: "A capitalist will sell you the rope with which to hang him." Prepare the noose while the Western populace sleeps.

5. There are theories about a planned oil pipeline through the Balkans and the (now fulfilled) need for a huge American base in Kosovo—Camp Bondsteel. And there is also the theory that the international forces are simply *terrified* of the Albanians and, given that they have been threatened with a 30,000-strong force prepared to kick them out, are simply trying to appease the monster they have created until they can devise a Plan B. They know that all hell will break loose when they deny independence.

So, take your pick of conspiracy theories as you wonder *why* "American interests" (under the guise of "humanitarianism" to "preempt ethnic cleansing") and NATO and UN agendas included setting such a dangerous precedent for the world in invading and occupying a sovereign (Christian) country in which, combined from both sides, 2,000 had been killed in two years of fighting between Serb police and Albanian "separatists" at the same time we turned a blind eye to the slaughter of more than a million Christians (not to mention other minorities) by Muslims in Sudan, Nigeria, Rwanda, Niger, Algeria, Angola, the Philippines, Indonesia, etc. Or *why* the UN now covers up the tragic consequences while presiding over the funneling of billions of dollars in taxpayer money to terrorists and organized criminals and the destruction of an ancient Christian civilization on behalf of Albanian and other Muslims.

## **THE WEST'S TRAGIC AND DISMAL FAILURE**

### **James Bissett**

Western policy in Kosovo since the illegal bombing of Serbia has been a tragic and dismal failure. Under the United Nations Protectorate and backed up by thousands of NATO troops, Kosovo has nonetheless degenerated into the “Black Hole” of Europe.

The story is a sad one with over 200,000 non-Albanians expelled from the province, over 150 Christian churches and monasteries destroyed and a daily round of murder and abduction of the few remaining Serbs and Romans. Kosovo has become a criminal fiefdom of the Kosovo Liberation Army [KLA]. Its standard of living has fallen to that of Haiti. More ominously, as we have heard today it is becoming a haven for Islamist extremists with ties to Al- Qaeda.

It was not meant to be this way. United Nations Resolution 1244 that ended the NATO bombing campaign was a sensible and judicious document. It reflected the peace agreement reached between NATO and Serbian authorities. More importantly it laid down the parameters for a successful and peaceful future for Kosovo by providing the framework for a functioning civil society, with democratic institutions, safety and security for all citizens and respect for the rule of law.

The Resolution highlighted the right of all refugees to return in safety to Kosovo regardless of ethnic or religious affiliation. It called for the disarming of the Kosovo Liberation Army and all other armed groups. It provided for limited numbers of Serbian military forces to patrol Kosovo's borders and to stand guard and protect Christian Holy places in Kosovo. Finally it fully complied with international law by underlining and honoring Serbia's sovereignty over Kosovo. In doing so, it categorically rejected the demand contained in the infamous Rambouillet Agreement for a referendum on Kosovo's autonomy.

Tragically it would seem that United Nations and NATO had no intention of honoring Resolution 1244. The sad performance of these two international organizations speaks for itself. These are hard facts. They stand as testimony to failure. The policies of the United Nations and NATO in Kosovo have been marked by double standards, duplicity and cowardice.

By any standard the Kosovo Albanians have proven incapable of governing themselves or others in a civilized manner. Their record of criminality and the barbarous way they have treated minorities has demonstrated unequivocally they are not qualified in any way to join the family of democratic countries as an independent state.

Their Prime Minister, Agim Ceku, has been indicted by Serbia for the murder of 669 Serbs while he was a KLA leader during the armed conflict in Kosovo in 1998/99. Ceku was in command of Croatian forces in 1993 when they over ran three Serbian villages protected by Canadian UN peacekeepers. When the Canadians counter attacked and regained the villages they found that all of the inhabitants and all of the animals in the villages had been slaughtered. Later during “Operation Storm,” the Croatian offensive that drove the Serbian population out of Croatia, it was Agim Ceku who ordered his artillery to bombard undefended Serbian towns and villages inflicting casualties on unarmed civilians.

Granting independence to Kosovo would be creating a failed state in the volatile Balkan region. A “failed state” is defined as a country that is unable to provide public services, physical security or economic livelihood to its inhabitants. A “failed state” becomes attractive to terrorist organizations as a safe haven and as a staging ground for attacks on other targets. The United States National Security Strategy has emphasized that, “America is now threatened less by

conquering states than we are by failing ones...poverty, weak institutions and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist net works.”

It is evident that an independent Kosovo possesses all of the characteristics of a “failed state.” Despite this there seems to be an inexplicable urgency on the part of the United States and the European Union to grant independence to Kosovo.

On September 20, 2006, the Contact Group [United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Russia], under whose auspices negotiations between Serbia and the Kosovo Albanians are being held, announced that a decision on independence for Kosovo must be reached before the end of the year. The Group had previously ruled that the negotiations could not result in returning Kosovo to the status it held before the March 1999 bombing of Serbia. The Group also ruled that neither side of the negotiations could block the process to determine the final status of Kosovo. It would appear obvious therefore that the framework for these negotiations has been designed to force the negotiators to only one conclusion – independence.

Earlier, the February 18-24 edition of the Economist magazine reported that John Sawers the political director of the British Foreign Office told a group of Serbians that the Contact Group had already decided on independence for Kosovo. Similar remarks by United States spokespeople have made it clear that independence is a strong possibility if not a predetermined outcome

The anti-Serb International Crisis Group [ICG] whose membership includes Morton Abramowitz, Wesley Clark, George Soros and Martti Ahtasaari, has recommended that the United Nations Special Envoy, who happens coincidentally to be Martti Ahtasaari and who is responsible for supervising the negotiations should be prepared to impose an, “independence package for Kosovo, however, diplomatically painful that may be in the short term ...”

There have been no expressions of alarm that the Special Envoy is in a conflict of interest because of his connection to the ICG. Ahtasaari has also openly stated he considers all of the Serbian people collectively guilty of the crimes committed by the Milosevic regime. One would think this kind of biased remark alone would be cause for his dismissal from the Special Envoy position. That he retains the confidence of the UN Secretary General is disturbing to say the least.

What seems to be overlooked in the discussions about Kosovo independence is that any imposed “independence package” for Kosovo without the agreement of Serbia would be in violation of international law. The principle of territorial integrity of states is a fundamental principle of international law and has been since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 the most effective instrument for the prevention of armed conflict between states. The principle is enshrined in the United Nations Charter and is considered to be one of the bedrock elements included in the concept of sovereign equality.

The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 reinforced the principle of territorial integrity by obliging states to refrain from any action against the territorial integrity of a participating state and to refrain from using force or the threat of force in the acquisition of another’s territory. The Act went further by including a section on the inviolability of frontiers which prohibited the seizure or usurpation of part or all the territory of any participating state.

These are fundamental principles and they form an integral part of the framework of international law. They are designed to be a guarantee of international security and mutual respect among nations. They cannot be put aside because a few powerful nations find it convenient to do so. They spell out a simple but clear message. Borders can only be changed by agreement between the states involved.

It is wrong to assume that a decision to grant Kosovo independence either by a decision by the UN Security Council or by a unilateral decision of the United States to recognize its

independence [and then use its influence to "persuade" fellow NATO allies to follow suit] would not be interpreted as a precedent. President Vladimir Putin of Russia has already made it clear that any decision on Kosovo would have a "universal nature" and would be a signal for a number of post-Soviet enclaves to demand similar treatment.

Transnistria in 1991 declared unilateral independence from Moldova and, with assistance of troops from Ukraine and Russia, resisted Moldovan attempts to prevent secession; but it has not gained recognition as an independent state. There is Nagorno-Karabakh, the Armenian enclave inside Azerbaijan that declared independence in 1991 and enjoys *de facto* independence, but has not gained recognition by the international community.

It is, however, in Georgia where the Kosovo precedent might have the most serious consequences. Two regions of Georgia have declared unilateral independence. The first was South Ossetia which declared independence in 1991 and following armed conflict with Georgian forces gained *de facto* autonomy but has not yet been recognized as an independent state. The second is Abkhazia that broke away from Georgia in 1992 and successfully defeated Georgian military attempts to prevent the separation. Abkhazia as well is anxious to gain recognition.

Russia strongly supports these two break away regions and has interpreted growing United States influence in Georgia as an aggressive incursion into Russia's traditional sphere of influence. As far as Russia is concerned what is good for Kosovo is also good for others who are aspiring for international recognition. Clearly then any decision on Kosovo independence will have serious implications for US-Russian relations and threatens to bring back old cold war animosities.

It is not only the former Soviet Union that will be affected by a decision on independence for Kosovo. There are long lists of peoples around the world that are waiting and striving for recognition as independent states. Many of these have a much stronger case for recognition than does Kosovo. The Kurds, numbering thirty million people and with a rich and ancient culture have a strong case for independent statehood. As the situation in Iraq continues to worsen Iraqi Kurds see renewed hope for carving out a state of their own. Their leadership will certainly regard a decision on Kosovo as a precedent to be followed by others with claims for independence.

Taiwan is another country that enjoys *de facto* independence but has not gained international recognition. It is a prosperous well functioning nation with a high standard of living. What about Kashmir, Tibet, Tamil Eelam? There are separatist movements in the Philippines, in Thailand, in Russia, in France, in Spain. Most if not all of these have an equal if not stronger case for independent statehood than does Kosovo. Many of the three million Hungarians living outside of Hungary would prefer to rejoin the motherland as would the Serbs and Croats in Bosnia.

A number of US officials have tried to pretend that a decision on Kosovo independence will not be a precedent and that Kosovo is unique. This is wishful thinking and falls into the trap of believing that something is true simply because someone says it is true. The reality is that the consequences of independence for Kosovo can be far reaching and harmful. It could set off a chain reaction of secessionist demands that could further destabilize an already troubled world preoccupied as it is with the resurgence of militant Islam.

The United Nations and NATO have made a mess of Kosovo. It has become an embarrassment and a costly failure. The United States want to wash their hands of the problem and get out as quickly as possible. The Europeans are frightened that a denial of independence might set off further violence by the well armed KLA and this time with their own forces being targeted. The assumption is that Serbia will simply have to swallow their pride accept the loss and

move forward with the promise of membership in the European Community and NATO as the reward for acquiescence.

This kind of thinking is wrong headed and dangerous. Independence is not the only solution for Kosovo. Serbia has accepted the reality that the Albanians in Kosovo must be given autonomy to manage their own affairs. This acceptance provides a realistic framework for other alternatives that could be explored short of independence. The example of Cyprus has been mentioned as a possible solution.

Partition is another possibility that could be considered with accompanying orderly population exchanges and financial assistance for those resettled. Real negotiations between the parties concerned with both sides gaining and losing is the appropriate means of reaching a solution that if not perfect would avoid the potential dangers of unilateral independence.

There is still time to resolve the Kosovo problem. What is required is an extension of the artificially imposed deadline for decision making and scrapping of the present rigid framework for negotiations that leads to only one solution. Both sides of the dispute can then be free to explore other solutions that do not rule out independence but offer Serbia something in return that would involve guarantees of protection for their Holy sites, territorial compensation for what is given up and salvaging of self respect.. There is nothing sacrosanct about borders. They can be changed by mutual consent.

Finally the United Nations and the NATO countries must face the unpleasant but essential task of demanding real reform in Kosovo. It should be made clear to the Kosovo leadership that crime, corruption, mistreatment of minorities will not be tolerated and that standards must be met before any further discussions about future status can begin. This is a difficult challenge but better to face it now than to create an independent state that is a haven for terrorism, narcotics and criminal activities. Then it will be too late.

## **KOSOVO: OUR DIRTY SECRET**

**John Hulsman**

In this brief consideration of the state of play on Kosovo, let's start with the EU end of the package. Implicit in all discussions in Brussels and other European capitals are a couple of dirty secrets that nobody is talking about – but that everybody in Berlin, or indeed Washington, knows what is going on. The first thing is that what we've had in Vienna *was not a negotiation*. A negotiation means you enter without preconceived outcomes and compromises are made on both sides. In a good negotiation nobody is very happy with the final outcome, like Michael Collins when he signed the partition of Ireland. You give and take, lose some and gain enough that the deal becomes sustainable in the long run.

The danger of avoiding real negotiations is that you are storing up trouble for later. You are not creating outcomes that last. That is true of the Arab-Israeli issue. The problem is that “the other side” does exist, whether you like it or not. Without making them stakeholders in the outcome, you are merely creating irridentist claims – you are not creating a stable outcome of any kind. The entire process so far is a waste of time, and I fear that is a huge intellectual failing here.

The vague promise of EU membership has been mentioned: in return for Serbia showing up at the table – stand still and look pretty, do the photo smile – will the Serbs really get EU membership? There is enlargement fatigue in the European Union, that is obvious although in Europe they don't say so aloud. They barely let in Romania and Bulgaria, under very different conditions that have never been used before. The idea that their door is still open is false.

If indeed EU membership is not on the cards for the region, including Serbia, you may get a “privileged partnership” – or whatever word the German Chancellor chooses. It simply means a pat on the shoulder, but *you are not in*. Is that a sustainable outcome in a stable Serbian society? Can we afford to risk it?

Take a look at the map of the Balkans. I have done this with my seven year old nephew, and he said, “well they all seem kind of little, but this one” (and he pointed to Serbia) “seems the most important, because its bigger and its in the center.” True, Max! Meaning, you can never work for the Bush Administration.

If stability in the region is our goal, you cannot leave the central country in that region so destabilized or so radicalized that the next morning everyone says, “gosh, this did not work the way we like.” If you do not look at the outcome of this reality, it does not mean it will not happen – the fact is that we've made these conditions possible.

Western diplomacy and statesmanship ought to be able to do better than that. Western diplomacy needs a reality check: do we, or don't we need a stable Serbia? This consideration has to enter these non-negotiations. In the present paradigm you just need to remember one simple formula, which is “the Serbs lose.” Ask what is it that the Serbs want, and then decide upfront that they cannot have it – but that others can have whatever it is that you've denied to the Serbs, and more. It is a simple formula, it is clear, but is it workable?

It's like the drunken gambler who re-doubles the bet. That is the mindset we're dealing with – that of cynical politicians and statesmen who want to get rid of the problem, and frustrated liberal ideologues who cannot admit that their ideology is flawed. They've got to just redouble their bet and try to make it work. They all know Kosovo has been a disaster, and they will say so privately, but they will never say so publicly because they could never again intervene at will around the world. If you're wrong about Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq... at a certain point you have to question whether what you're doing is the right thing or not – and they are

desperate to avoid that. There is a gap of about 60 years between mistakes of today and apologies of tomorrow, but by that time all the actors are dead.

The European Union is *not* going to somehow make this OK on the ground because the Americans now have more serious things to worry about. This American non-involvement is not necessarily a bad thing, and it could be a very good thing. But the problem is that the United States are not coordinating this lack of involvement with the Europeans, and this is a problem. If we say to the Europeans, “you deal with it” – and they say “great, we can finally do something” – and then something bad happens in the region and America has another crisis, that could destroy trans-Atlantic relations.

Any settlement without a stake in that agreement of all the major regional players, will not be a durable one. We’ve heard all too often, “the United States should force, United States must kill, United States must dictate” – and that has worked so well in Iraq! You’ve got to give a stake to people who actually live there. By trying to impose an independent Kosovo we become a convenient scapegoat by our stupidity and that helps neither the United States, nor the people of Serbia, nor the people of the region.

## **A CRITICAL ISSUE BACK ON THE RADAR SCREEN**

### **Doug Bandow**

Kosovo is a critical issue which for the most part has stayed under the radar screen for a long time. Washington is a town which has trouble chewing gum and walking at the same time, and there is a lot on the plate of this administration. The more that is on the plate, the harder it is for them to pay much attention.

There are lots of people around the world who want independence, nobody wants to give it, and it is one of those internal struggles that will never end. I had the opportunity to travel to Kosovo back in the summer of 1998, the year before the bombing. The violence was heating up. I spent a week wondering around, visiting Serbian officials, running into KLA guerillas, and talking to university students. While I found much to criticize in the regime, I was absolutely appalled at the disconnect between the story in Washington and the facts on the ground. The Kosovo Liberation Army was no different than the usual guerrilla force. Indeed, a U.S. diplomat labeled the KLA a "terrorist" organization. Although the conflict was ugly, over the years most European states had combated one or another secessionist movement. Moreover, in global terms, Kosovo was minor, a tiny horror compared to, for instance, Sierra Leone, in which an estimated quarter of a million people died.

It was quite obvious that we had policy makers in Washington, in Brussels and other capitals throughout Europe, who literally had no clue as to what was going on. Especially the notion that there is going to be some kind of multi-cultural paradise that could be built through the intervention of the United Nations and the United States, was clearly an absolute fantasy. What we found was a transformation of NATO.

I had always thought of alliances as being designed to prevent war. I never expected we'd go to war to *preserve* alliances. It struck me as a rather strong transformation of the historic mission of NATO. It has been successful because it had been effective in protecting democratic states. The notion that you would invade and attack another country which has done nothing to you was complete destruction of what NATO was all about.

In the course of the debate on intervening in the Balkans we had a series of policy missteps. The outcome of the war, of course, was that we had the second largest ethnic cleansing in the region after the allies physically won. What we found in March 2004 was a continuation of that policy of extraordinary violence. I visited Kosovo last July; I've seen churches that had been destroyed, graveyards that have been destroyed, and there is continuing process of deterioration. But there is no attempt made – no obvious, effective attempt – to prevent this ongoing process of destruction of the Serbian community. All of this has happened on the American and European watch. It is extraordinary for countries that proclaim their devotion to democracy and human rights can close their eyes to this kind of destruction. Such policy is a real discredit to them.

It was also a mistake to believe that an allied military occupation of Kosovo could teach the majority good manners. If there is a time when you would think that you could effectively encourage better behavior towards religious and ethnic minorities, it would be a time when we had troops there; it would be a time before independence had been granted; it would be a time when, theoretically, one had leverage. But unfortunately that has not worked. Now when we move towards independence, it only gets worse.

If we give independence to Kosovo, we will prove to the world that threats work. If you threaten violence, if you cause trouble – you'll get your demands. In the end, frankly, the allies just want to get rid of this problem, and they want to get rid of it quickly because they perceive an

unruly majority that is getting impatient. But can we “solve” the problem by deciding to declare independence, declare the Kosovo mission a victory, add on a couple of conditions, rattle about democracy, human rights, and our great success?

The second lesson that would be learned, is that prior “conditions” are irrelevant. It does not matter what you promise, just *promise*. If we do not have ethnic tolerance, if we do not have the civic institutions, if we do not have the commitment to uphold these values, the “conditions” will be irrelevant. Individual and collective rights, human rights, religious liberty, the West may talk about these things but in the end no one really cares. This is a kind of hypothetical posturing as opposed to reality.

If you are concerned about stability and the region, the last thing you want to do is to turn Kosovo into an independent state. There is no reason to believe that granting independence will create stability, and the appetite of ethnic Albanians throughout the region will not be satisfied by Kosovo. Do you want to set up a process by which people assume they are entitled to independence, and perceive that they can achieve independence by violence or threat of violence? This process is very dangerous for regional stability. You don’t want to send a message that if you lever your pleas for independence with violence, you win! And if people see how the precedent has worked, there is no reason to believe that, throughout the Balkans and elsewhere, people will not want to apply it.

Washington and its allies believed that they would be able to concoct a multi-ethnic Kosovo in which Albanians and Serbs would join hands singing "Kumbaya" around communal camp fires. In fact, having used their American-supplied air force to eject the Serb military, the victorious ethnic Albanians saw no need to compromise to preserve the ethnic Serb population. Quite the contrary, the most vocal (and violent) Albanians wanted the Serbs to leave.

Shortly after the war ended, Secretary Albright declared: “Another key issue is whether the new Kosovo will include its ethnic Serb, Roma, and other minorities, and whether they will be able to live safely now that Belgrade’s forces have withdrawn.” With unintended irony, she added, “We will measure our success by whether the rights of all those who choose to live in Kosovo are respected.” At that very moment America’s allies, the Albanian majority, were conducting ethnic cleansing on a grand scale, kicking out most Serbs, Jews, Roma, and even non-Albanian Muslims. As upwards of 200,000 people were fleeing Kosovo, Albright was telling the Council on Foreign Relations in America that the allied occupation force “takes seriously its mandate to protect Kosovars, including Serbs. And its effectiveness will increase as deployment continues, and demilitarization gains steam.” In the meantime Serbs were regularly killed, beaten, and kidnapped; Serbian enclaves were vulnerable to drive-by shootings. All told, a thousand Serbs are believed to have been killed since 1999. Attacks eventually diminished, largely because most of the Serbs had fled. Just 120 of 40,000 Serbs remain in the capital of Pristina, for instance. Almost all ethnic Serbs live in enclaves, many isolated within majority Albanian areas. Any Serb who travels outside an enclave does so at his own risk. At the quasi-border between Serbia and Kosovo, most drivers replace their Serbian license plates with ones marked Kosovo. Otherwise, they would risk not only their cars but their lives. (Some clueless British tourists recently were roughed up and their car was destroyed because the vehicle had been rented in Belgrade.)

No surprise, the violence did not encourage ethnic reconciliation. Derek Chappell, spokesman for the UN military force, UNMIK, observed, “[S]ome in the Kosovo Albanian leadership believe that by cleansing all remaining Serbs from the area ... and destroying Serbian cultural sites, they can present the international community with a *fait accompli*.” Even the International Crisis Group (ICG), which believes in a multilateral response to every problem, acknowledged that the rampage “shattered international confidence that the Albanians were committed to a tolerant society,” confidence that obviously was never justified.

So many violent incidents should yield a prosecution-rich environment, but not so. Despite occasional international hand-wringing, few of those responsible even for murder have been prosecuted. Marek Antoni Nowicki, former international ombudsman for Kosovo, acknowledged last month that “in Kosovo police can find information on who committed a crime, but they can't get evidence and witnesses. No one wants to testify, because testifying in Kosovo, not just about ethnically motivated crimes, is very dangerous.”

While the Albanian political leadership did not publicly support the attacks, its complicity seems probable: former guerrilla leaders, some accused of wartime atrocities, run the government. And their goals likely remain unchanged from 1999. Acknowledges the ICG, "With no vision for the future of Serbs in Kosovo, one might suspect that the latent Albanian hope is that they will all eventually sell out and leave." The *Washington Post* captured this attitude when it quoted an 18-year-old ethnic Albanian cigarette vendor: "Really, the Serbs ought to go back to Serbia." The ethnic Albanian leadership also has been implicated in the explosion of organized crime, including drug dealing, money laundering, and sex trafficking. Maria Kalavis, UNICEF's regional director for Southeast Europe, recently warned, "We know that child trafficking within Kosovo's borders is on the rise." Some have referred to Kosovo as the "black hole" of Europe.

Although Islam was never much of a factor in the past, radical Islam appears to be on the rise. There has been an influx of Saudi money, which has underwritten many of the 200 mosques constructed since 1999; on a recent trip, I saw a Saudi flag flying over a mosque. Christian converts have been threatened, and some analysts believe that terrorists have infiltrated the Balkans through Kosovo as well as Bosnia. Thomas Gambill, a onetime OSCE security official, has observed, "My biggest concern has always been the incursion of radical Islam into the area." Imagine the possibilities: Kosovo, the newest tourist destination! "Sex, crime, terrorism, it's all there," one U.S. diplomat recently told me.

All told, even the most optimistic assessment of Kosovo's progress suggests a disappointing record after years of tutelage in democracy by the "international community." At a congressional hearing in May, Charles English of the State Department stated, "Discrimination remains a serious problem. Access to public services is uneven. Incidents of harassment still occur. Freedom of movement is limited. And too many minorities still feel unsafe in Kosovo." Similarly, Joseph Griebowski of the Institute on Religion and Public Policy argues that "the present record of rule of law, protection of the rights of religious and ethnic minorities, and the return/resettlement of internally displaced people by the Provisional Authority of Kosovo – all of which are indispensable for democratic governance – have been gravely unsatisfactory."

Even Javier Solana, the European Union's foreign policy head, and Kai Eide, the UN's special envoy, last year criticized Kosovo's failure to meet the political benchmarks necessary for gaining independence. Earlier this year, the ICG, which continues to push for an independent Kosovo, warned, "The international community's immediate priority is to avert a new exodus of Serbs, new Albanian-Serb clashes, or a new wave of burning houses and churches." Kosovo hardly sounds ready for primetime.

But the facts on the ground appear to have little impact on allied policy. The Western powers are now preparing to declare victory and leave – with a planned celebratory lap for good measure. They once advanced a policy of standards before status. More recently, however, Nicholas Burns, undersecretary of state for political affairs, advocated "standards and status."

The subtle shift reflects the fact that the allies, which privately recognize the insoluble mess that they created, desperately want out, and that means giving Kosovo what it wants. The Contact Group (U.S., Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia) in January 2006 stated that there should be "no return of Kosovo to the pre-1999 situation, no partition of Kosovo, and no union of Kosovo with any or part of another country."

Kofi Annan selected former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari as UN special envoy to oversee talks on Kosovo's future, and the latter is thought by many to have promised ethnic Albanians independence. Along the way, he made his bias known, suggesting that the Serbs were collectively guilty for Milosevic's misbehavior. And Ahtisaari, along with other allied leaders, have continually browbeat Serbia to accept Kosovo's independence.

Western journalists and analysts have provided a background drumbeat. Typical was Tod Lindberg of *Policy Review*, who contended that "Serbia needs to decide whether its future is Western integration or instead a return to dead-end nationalist politics." Daniel Serwer of the U.S.-funded United States Institute of Peace cheerfully opined, "Serbs will resent the loss of Kosovo, but it is not a vital national interest and they will get over it, as they have quickly got over the loss of Montenegro."

In short, the recent negotiations have been a pious fraud, intended to offer a veneer of legitimacy for a decision made long ago.

But Belgrade has not been willing to play along. The latest round of UN-sponsored talks on Kosovo recently ended with no agreement. Deadlock impends. Observes Albert Rohan, in charge of the Vienna negotiations, "We could talk for another 10 years and not change anything." Ahtisaari says that an agreement is not in the cards, "at least not in my lifetime."

The official villain is obvious. For instance, the Contact Group has denounced Serbia's "obstruction." Morton Abramowitz and Mark L. Schneider, both associated with the ICG, argue that even if Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica "continues to stonewall," independence should be granted. The reason? The Serbs are being intransigent in offering everything short of independence. (Even Ahtisaari admits that the Serbs "would agree to anything but independence.") In contrast, the Albanians are demonstrating flexibility in demanding nothing but independence. (Kosovo "President" Fatmir Sejdiu declared independence "the alpha and omega, the beginning and the end of our position.") It is like living in a *Star Trek* parallel universe.

All through this international farce the Western allies cheerfully retained the pretense of objectivity. Even as it denounced Belgrade, the Contact Group called for "a negotiated settlement." Undersecretary Burns stated, "One of the primary factors that concerns us going into these negotiations is that, at the end of them, neither side emerges as a loser in the process." But he fooled no one. The ethnic Albanians know the West is desperate to get out. They have no reason to make any concessions beyond formalistic promises to respect the Serb minority, promises that are unlikely to be kept by the Albanians or enforced by the allies.

There is no simple, fair, and just solution to Kosovo's final status. The ethnic Albanians understandably don't want to live under Serb rule. The ethnic Serbs understandably don't want to live under Albanian rule. Majority rule favors ethnic Albanians, but the steady population shift from Serb to Albanian last century reflected political decisions by the communist government as well as natural demographics.

None of Kosovo's neighbors, save Albania, favors independence. Many of them have their own ethnic Albanian populations, some of which also desire independence or incorporation into a greater Albania. Indeed, the "principle" of Kosovar independence would have widespread implications, reaching from Bosnia's Serbs to Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia to Spain's Basques to Taiwan and even to America – some Mexicans call southern California, grabbed by the U.S. after its victory in the Mexican-American War, "Aztlán," and predict its eventual reconquest through immigration. Writes *National Interest* editor Nikolas Gvosdev, "there are very real concerns that the Kosovo question, if mishandled, will prove to be destabilizing not only for the region, but for the international system as a whole."

The least satisfactory answer at the present time is independence. Establishing the precedent of international intervention to stop ongoing bloodshed is problematic enough. Establishing the precedent of international intervention to dismember another sovereign state is worrisome indeed.

It would be even worse to do so based on the illusion that the "international community" can forcibly engineer a federal state that protects minority rights. For instance, the ICG speaks of "forging an inclusive, multi-ethnic state identity for Kosovo, as a tool to engage minority communities and the European Union." The Washington-based Alliance for a New Kosovo dreamily predicted, "At the time when the prospective 'clash of civilizations' between the West and Islam is widely feared, the creation of a Muslim-majority secular state, tolerant of all ethnic peoples regardless of personal creed, would be viewed as a victory for the national values espoused by the United States and the nations of the European Union."

In fact, independence almost certainly means more ethnic cleansing. A top U.S. official in Kosovo told me on my recent visit that he figures not a Serb would remain within five or 10 years after independence. That is, granting Kosovo independence would mean the completion of the process of ethnic cleansing that began seven years ago. Worse, since the West has been in charge, granting independence would mean ratifying the very process that the allies went to war to prevent.

Perhaps worst of all, however, if the West imposes independence, it will be doing so in response to the threat of violence. Ethnic Albanian unrest is palpable. The group Self-Determination! has been organizing nonviolent protests against the UN (some demonstrators have gone to jail, unlike the killers of hapless Serbs). More ominously, a so-called Kosovo Independence Army already has begun threatening UNMIK personnel and destroying occupation vehicles. Adem Demaci, a leading ethnic Albanian politician, last year warned of "violence of such dimensions that 17 March 2004 will be forgotten" if the West does not grant independence. The speaker of Kosovo's legislature announced in September that "if our aim of independence is not realized, then citizen's revolts are expected." Western officials privately acknowledge that they fear violent unrest if they don't grant independence.

In order to get around this rather embarrassing dilemma, Western governments are talking about conditional independence, that is, independence only after ethnic Albanians meet certain standards. Proponents of this "solution" may be criminally naive; more likely, they are simply seeking the least publicly embarrassing strategy to get out of Kosovo.

However, despite all the right public promises from Albanian officials to respect the rights of minorities, there is little reason to believe popular attitudes have changed. Bishop Artemije (Radosavljevic) of Raska and Prizren sadly observes that "crimes happened not just seven years ago but are happening now as we speak." One resident of a refugee camp who fled deadly mobs two years ago told me that "we see people living in our homes and sleeping in our beds talking about how good democracy is."

And if seven years of tutelage by the allies under military occupation isn't enough to teach the majority Albanian community democratic manners, what more can the allies do? The ICG has plaintively called on the UNMIK to use its remaining time, after seven years of failure, to "create at least a little more democratic space, limit the entrenchment of kleptocracy, and encourage incorporation into the system of new political blood." Good luck.

Nor will tough conditions imposed as part of the independence process likely be enforced. Everyone knows that the allies will not get tough and block independence; they are even less likely to return the territory to Belgrade if the ethnic Albanian majority violates its promises. The West has done little enough to protect the Serbian community while occupying

Kosovo. They won't even have the theoretical ability to act with a minimal military presence in an independent Kosovo. Moreover, even before independence has been granted, the ICG is campaigning to create a Kosovo military (of course, "both the legacy of the insurgent Kosovo Liberation Army and those linked to organized crime, must be minimized" and minorities must be protected – presumably as they are today). The supposed humanitarian crusaders of 1999 simply want to withdraw their 17,000 troops and go home.

The most important barrier to the West's cynical game is winning UN approval for Kosovo's independence. Even as the U.S. and Europeans decided on independence, their relationship with Russia deteriorated, raising the possibility that Moscow might block independence. China, aware of the implications for Taiwan, also might oppose Serbia's forcible dismemberment. If either power vetoes an allied UN resolution to grant independence, the Balkans will go from a regional to a global problem.

However, the allies still have time to step back from the brink. They should restart the negotiations, insisting that they really are negotiations. The ethnic Albanians should understand that intransigence does not guarantee victory. The fact that there is no plan to satisfy everyone should impel the two sides and interested outside parties to think creatively about mechanisms to meet the other side's strongest interests and objections. For instance, one proposal would grant ethnic Albanians citizenship in an authority subject to EU governance even while living in a Kosovo administered by Serbia. A system of parallel citizenship in the same territory might be awkward, but it offers one approach that breaks free of the independence/autonomy stalemate.

Equally important, the allies should drop multiculturalism as an objective. Last year, Undersecretary Burns told Congress that "failure to secure a multi-ethnic Kosovo would be a failure" of years of effort. No, failure to achieve a solution widely accepted as legitimate that allows all Kosovars to live in peace and promotes regional stability would be a failure. The allies have no warrant to force people who hate each other to live together.

One proposal, disliked by Washington, is to leave the Serb-dominated city of Mitrovica, and adjoining territory north of the Ibar River, with Belgrade while granting Kosovo independence. The idea horrifies Western officials. Joachim Rucker, head of the UN's civil administration in Kosovo, says that it will "resolutely" prevent secession. Partition within partition may or may not be a good idea, but Western officials pushing to partition Serbia are in no position to object to it in principle.

Washington should never have intervened in the Balkans. The region was a minor interest to Europe and of virtually no importance to America. The allies managed to replace ethnic cleansing with ethnic cleansing and, more than seven years after their glorious victory, have no idea how to finish their international project. At this point the West's primary goal should be to not make the problem worse, as would forcibly dismembering Kosovo and creating a potential failed state. Kosovo offers the U.S. a foreign policy model of what not to do: intervene in a distant civil war of no geopolitical concern to America.

It has been very easy to get into Kosovo; it is not at all easy for the West to get out. There is no silver bullet. We need to demand two things, the first of which is creativity. There is no easy answer, but certainly the answer of handing independence tomorrow, and feeling good about yourself, is not a solution. The second demand is to start negotiating. What we've had so far, and what we have today, are not *negotiations*. The West, and the United States in particular, need to say "we want real negotiations, there is no predetermined outcome and we are not going to allow one side to determine that outcome." Time is running short, but there still is a chance for Americans, Europeans and others to demand that their governments do the right thing.

In Kosovo, the right thing morally is also the right in terms practical consequences.

## APPENDIX I SIR ALFRED SHERMAN'S FINAL WORD ON KOSOVO

**Sir Alfred Sherman, a prominent British political analyst and former advisor to Margaret Thatcher, was a founding member of The American Council for Kosovo's Board of Advisors and its active contributor until his death last August. Sir Alfred passed away a month before our conference in Washington D.C. but as a tribute to our distinguished friend and ally we publish his final thoughts on Kosovo, written shortly before his death.**

### **THE ASSAULT ON SERBIA BY THE WEST** **Sir Alfred Sherman**

Not for the first time, the Serbs are being subjected to a pogrom. As in the case of all pogroms, the cause lies in the nature of the perpetrators, not the victim's. The West, that is to say NATO, which has been leading the pogrom, is beset by deep distemper, one of whose many manifestations has been chronic Serbophobia. This is one symptom of the ingrained masochism and national or civilizational self-hatred which has been plaguing the West increasingly since the dawn of the last century.

The self-hatred has taken many forms. *Nostalgie de la boue*, emotional identification with backward societies, blind sympathy with destructive revolutionary forces and regimes, and crude Islamophilia are among the symptoms. It is mainly a product of the twentieth century, though antecedents can be traced earlier. Communism exemplifies it. Magical wisdom and powers were accorded to the proletariat, flying in the face of logic and experience. The conceited claims of semi-literate monsters like Stalin and Mao were taken at face value, their assaults on civilization assisted. In many parts of Britain, Christian symbols and practices are outlawed or hindered by authorities on the grounds that they constitute discrimination against non-Christian minorities. Similar action is taken against literary and historical expressions of Britishness. As a result, associated cardinal values: patriotism, loyalty, the family, morality are under threat.

Christianity continually needs creative restatement in light of science and social change. The exploitation of patriotism by fascism in its various forms has left national values exposed. The moral and intellectual vacuum generated by the decline of national consciousness, patriotism and Christianity has opened the way for worship of strange Gods. Among them, Islam, the world of the Near East, beckons.

Reality is not far behind ideas. Europe, which for centuries was the source of migration, peopling the Americas, Oceania and parts of Africa, has become the target for mass immigration by Islam, Asia and Africa. Various pretexts have been advanced for this by immigrationists, in particular labor shortage. This is evidently fallacious. Europe has always been at a loss to employ its growing population, both numerically and because most advances of technology obviate need for people. Backward countries export backward people, whose labor is decreasingly relevant to advanced countries, who absorb more in welfare than they produce. Hence only a minority of immigrants of working age from Pakistan and Bangladesh are in employment, swelling the ranks of the massive welfariat, even a lower proportion of Somalis. But the immigrants have set up their own states within a state, and are readily granted privileges to enable them to recreate their *milieux*. Much of social and economic policy is designed to favor them and maintain their separate identity. By now, Moslems have breached the ten per cent barrier in Western and Central Europe. Governments seem helpless or unwilling to stem the tide. Spokesmen for the European Community laud this Moslem colonization as Europe and the Moslem world as coming together, ignoring its utter one-sidedness.

Criticism of these trends is stifled as “racism”, ignoring considerations of patriotism, national consciousness and social order. The undermining of national homogeneity based on common values is leading to visible social breakdown. In whole areas of London, the English are in a minority, particularly among the school population. Communal cohesion has suffered as a result. Man still does not live by bread alone, but the refurbishment of spiritual values may not be an autonomous process. Public spiritedness, once based on commonality of national sentiment, is correspondingly declining.

These developments are reflected in policy. In dealing with former Yugoslavia, it is taken for granted by policy-makers and commentators that the Moslems, so-called *Bosniaks*, a product of Ottoman rule, are the indigenous population and are oppressed by alien Serbs and Macedonians. Ignorance of Balkan history facilitates this distortion, but underlying it is alienation from a sense of Euro-Christian history and values. It is no accident that the United States has been leading this gadarene rush. Sense of history is not America’s strong point. Immigrants came to shake the dust of imperial Europe off their feet, but in fact transplanted it. A majority of Americans are God-fearing and traditionalist, but the tone-setters: academics; communicators; entertainers, and politicians; are boring away at its entrails.

Serbdom is particularly vulnerable to these trends. During the Second World War, the British colluded with the Russians in imposing an atheistic communist dictatorship on Yugoslavia. The interests of the long-suffering Serb nation were subordinated to Tito’s megalomaniac designs, which included harnessing the Moslem world to Soviet cold-war expansionism while Communist Yugoslavia gained additional status as a major Soviet partner. This left no room for the essentially *Christian character of Serbdom*, including the western Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Krajina, and other parts of the newly-created xenophobic Croatian Republic. Serbia’s appeal to the Christian world has thereby gone by default; yet it is an essential element of Serbdom’s right to live.

The Euro-American pogrom against the Serbs totally ignores their beleaguered Christian essence and traditions. This can be put down in part to the West’s compulsive secularization, in part to the Serbs’ own long integration into Yugoslavia and particularly the communist period, and in part to aping of Western secularism. There are also residues in it of the great schism in Christianity, exploited by Clero-fascism in Croatia. The Judeo-Christian character of Serbdom, which is a major part of its identity and right to survive, and which unites Old Serbia, Rashka, Montenegro and the Vojvodina, is passed over in silence. Christians in Europe and the US are not apprised of the religious nature of Serbdom.

These developments have been in line with the secularization of politics which has been a characteristic of recent centuries. But history never stands still. In the United States, a re-assertion of Christianity in society is taking place and has begun to reassert an influence over politics. Even in Europe, the general trend towards secularization does not have it all its own way: resistance to Turkey’s acceptance into the European Union grounds of its essentially Christian character is a pointer. The uncompromising nature of Islam’s hatred of the West, intensified and not mitigated in response to Western appeasement, has been the organized mob violence in several continents rationalized by cartoons in a low circulation Danish publication. It is a reminder that appeasement is always counter-productive. It follows that assertion of Serbia’s right to support on grounds of its Christian reassertion against both Moslem and post-communist aggression, is not special pleading but a statement of common interests.

More than that, it is time to remind Euro-America of its Judeo-Christian character, rights and duties, in its own interests no less than the interests and rights of Serbs. This will be Serbia’s positive contribution to the Western world’s fight-back. I ask for no favors, but for a common struggle to defend a common heritage against a perennial threat.

APPENDIX II  
SERBIAN SOVEREIGNTY VS ALBANIAN SELF-DETERMINATION  
Raju G. C. Thomas

*Professor Thomas was U.S. Visiting Fulbright Professor, Faculty of the Political Sciences, Belgrade University, 2005-2006; he is Allis Chalmers Distinguished Professor of International Affairs at Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.*

**The Serbian-Albanian Paradox** -- As to whether whether Kosovo should remain part of Serbia or become an independent state, the “international community” should resolve its status in accordance with the practice of international law, not on Albanian claims of victimhood, or personal images of good Albanians and evil Serbs. International law generally has favored the territorial integrity and sovereignty of existing states and rejected the right of self-determination, whatever the historical origins of state boundaries.

For Albanians, this is residential land. For the Serbs, this is their religious and emotional heartland, no different than the historic land of Israel to the Jews. Kosovo is to Serbia as Kyoto is to Japan, their cultural and religious center. The BBC’s “Kosovo Timeline” states that “Kosovo lies at the heart of the Serbian empire under the Nemanjic dynasty.... The period sees the building of many Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries.” Under Ottoman rule, “over the centuries the religious and ethnic balance tips in favour of Muslims and Albanians.... Serbia regains control of Serbia from the Turks, recognized by the 1913 Treaty of London.” Following NATO’s military action in 1999, UN Security Council Resolution 1244, reaffirmed that Kosovo is part of Serbia.

**Demographic Transformation** -- A demographic transformation has taken place in Kosovo while it remained a part of Serbia. Over the last decades, this demographic change was caused by the flight of Serbs from Kosovo under Albanian harassment, better opportunities in Serbia, higher Albanian birthrates, and Albanians coming across the border from Albania into Kosovo within Tito’s Yugoslavia where economic opportunities were better. Similar conditions prevail in Texas, New Mexico and California where the Mexican population is overtaking the White Anglo population. However, such demographic changes within a province of a state cannot justify the demand for new independent states.

**The Irredentist Terrorist Strategy of Victimhood** -- Albanian claims of victimhood, and therefore the right to independence, is no different from that of similar claims in Nigeria (Ibos), India (Kashmiris), Russia (Chechens), Turkey (Kurds) and Sri Lanka (Tamils). Claims of victimhood by Albanians in Kosovo are minor compared to these regions. In all of these cases, terrorist attacks on civilians and police are intended to invite overwhelming military retaliation by the state against an enemy that cannot be distinguished from the civilian population. There is an outcry of human rights violations against the state, and appeals to the international community by the minority group for independent statehood.

The extremely violent independence movement led by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE) for an independent Tamil state against the wishes of the majority Sinhalese-dominated federal government in Sri Lanka, has continued for more than two decades without resolution. The LTTE was labeled a terrorist organization by the US State Department, just as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was also labeled as such earlier by State. Both the LTTE and the KLA adopted the means of terrorist attacks to achieve its territorial goals. Whether it is the Tamils, the Kashmiris, the Chechens, the Kurds, the Palestinians, or the Kosovo Albanians led by the KLA, such tactics to carve out independent states should not be allowed to succeed. It will encourage similar tactics elsewhere among ethnic groups wishing to secede from an existing sovereign state.

**Legitimizing NATO's Illegal Military Fait Accompli** -- NATO attacked Serbia over the Kosovo issue on humanitarian grounds claiming that genocide was going on. This was triggered by the discovery of a mass grave of some 40 Albanian men. French newspapers have raised questions about this grave since the men were all laid neatly in a row and that forensics indicated that they had been killed at different times suggesting KLA encounters with Serbian forces. Following the attack, no genocide was discovered, no 100,000 killed as PM Tony Blair and Defense Secretary speculated.

Meanwhile, the official Western justification continues that NATO bombed Serbia *because* Serbian forces ethnically cleansed virtually the entire Albanian population of 2 million out of Kosovo. There is a problem with this chronology. The flight of Albanian refugees began *after* NATO commenced the bombing of Serbia. Prior to that there were some 3,000 Albanians who had moved out to escape the civil war between the Kosovo Liberation Army and Serbian security forces. The flight of refugees stemmed mainly from mass civilian panic because of the bombing and fear of Serbian retaliation against them, a retaliation that did not take place. And as Kelly Greenhill, an MIT, Harvard and Stanford scholar, observed, Serb forces drove out Albanian civilians only in those areas where the KLA was operating. There was a military and humanitarian strategy underlying this. The KLA insurgents and terrorists were indistinguishable from the Albanian civilian population. Thus by driving out the Albanian civilian population in these areas, Serb forces were saving civilian lives from getting caught in the cross-fire between them and the KLA.

NATO bypassed the UN Security Council in going to war against Serbia. It violated NATO's charter which states that it is a defensive organization. Serbia had attacked no member of NATO. The decision to go to war was based on a setup at the Rambouillet negotiations which demanded that all Serb forces will be withdrawn from Kosovo, Kosovo Albanians will be given a referendum for independence in three years, and that NATO will occupy all of Serbia in the meantime. This was an ultimatum designed to be rejected by Milosevic, a pretext for war.

**Gaining Independence Under International Law** -- Kosovo may obtain independence under international law on the willingness of the federal government in Belgrade to grant it. For example, in August 1998, the Canadian Supreme Court, while acknowledging that Canada is not indivisible, declared that Quebec could not secede through a simple majority vote among its residents. The terms of secession would have to be negotiated with the rest of Canada as an amendment to the Canadian constitution. The nine Canadian justices indicated that while such a secession would be theoretically feasible, it would be difficult, painful and costly, suggesting that it was not likely to be accepted in practice. More importantly, the Canadian Supreme Court (that included 3 judges from Quebec) declared that under international law, there is no right of unilateral secession except territories that are judged to be colonies of oppressed peoples. Quebec did not fulfill this category. Does Kosovo? Do Kosovo Albanians have a greater right to independence than demands elsewhere?

**Should Belgrade Concede Kosovo's Independence?** -- Perhaps it would be in the interests of Serbia to let Kosovo go. It appears unrealistic for Serbia to regain control and maintain law and order. Serb forces would face indefinite attacks from the KLA who would be indistinguishable from Albanian civilians. Serb civilians of Kosovo are unlikely to return under these circumstances. The trade-off offered by the United States to Serbia for relinquishing Kosovo is faster entry into NATO and the EU. On the other hand, there are cases where such violent struggles for independence were resolved within the territorial boundaries of the state, e.g., the Ibos of Nigeria, the Sikhs of India, and even the Serbs of Bosnia. The territorial integrity and sovereignty of every breakaway republic of the former Yugoslavia has been preserved -- Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia. So must that of Serbia.

**APPENDIX III:  
HISTORICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE KOSOVO CRISIS**



PARLIAMENT OF CANADA – PARLEMENT DU CANADA  
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade  
Comité Permanent des Affaires Étrangères et du Commerce International

**The “Clinton Doctrine” and Its Consequences**

Transcript of a testimony by Dr. Srdja Trifkovic on the war over Kosovo  
Ottawa, Thursday, February 17, 2000

<http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/committee/362/fait/evidence/ev1039974/faitev21-e.htm>

**Mr. Srdja Trifkovic:** The war waged by NATO against Yugoslavia in 1999 marks a significant turning point, not only for the United States and NATO but for “the West” as a whole. The principle of state sovereignty and the rule of law itself has been subverted in the name of an ideology that is allegedly humanitarian. Facts have been converted into fiction and even the fictions invoked to justify the act are giving up all pretence to credibility. All systems for the protection of national liberties—political, legal and economic—have now been subverted into vehicles for their own destruction. But so far from demonstrating the vigour of western ruling elites in a ruthless pursuit of an ideology of multi-ethnic democracy and international human rights, the whole sordid Balkan entanglement may serve as a disturbing revelation of those ruling elites’ moral and cultural decay. I shall therefore devote my remarks to the consequences of the war for the emerging new international system and ultimately for the security and stability of the western world itself.

Almost a decade separated Desert Storm from “humanitarian bombing.” In 1991 the Maastricht Treaty was signed and the rest of the decade has brought a gradual usurpation of traditional European sovereignty by a corporate-controlled Brussels regime of unelected bureaucrats. On this side of the ocean we had the passage of NAFTA, and in 1995 the Uruguay Round of GATT gave us the WTO. The nineties were thus a decade of gradual foundation laying for the new international order.

The denigration of sovereign nationhood hypnotized the public into applauding the dismantling of the very institutions that offer the only hope of representative government. The process is sufficiently far advanced for President Clinton to claim in his article, “A Just and Necessary War”, in the *New York Times* (May 23, 1999), that, had it not bombed Serbia, “NATO itself would have been discredited for failing to defend the very values that give it meaning.”

The war was in fact both unjust and unnecessary, but the significance of Mr. Clinton’s statement is that he has openly declared null and void the international system in existence ever since the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648. It was an imperfect and often-violated system, but nevertheless it provided the basis for international discourse from which only the assorted red and black totalitarians have openly deviated.

Since March 24, 1999, this has been replaced by the emerging *Clinton doctrine*, a carbon copy of the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty that supposedly justified the Soviet-led occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Like his Soviet predecessor, Mr. Clinton used an abstract and ideologically loaded notion, that of universal human rights, as the pretext to violate the law and tradition. The Clinton doctrine is rooted in the bipartisan hubris of Washington’s foreign policy elite, tipsy on its own heady brew of “the world’s last and only superpower.” Legal formalities are passé, and moral imperatives, never sacrosanct in international affairs anyway, are replaced by a cynical exercise in situational morality, dependent on an actor’s position within the superpower’s value system.

And so imperial high-mindedness is back, but in a new form. Old religion, national flags, and nationalist rivalry play no part. But the yearning for excitement and importance that took the British to Peking and Kabul and Khartoum, the French to Fashoda and Saigon, and the Americans to Manila has now re-emerged. As a result, a war was waged on an independent nation because it refused foreign troops on its soil. All other justifications are *ex post facto* rationalizations. The powers that waged that war have aided and abetted secession by ethnic minorities, secession that, once formally effected, will render many European borders tentative. In the context of any other European nation, the story would sound surreal. The Serbs, however, have been demonized to the point where they must not presume to be treated like others.

But the fact that the west could do anything it chose to do to the Serbs does not explain why it should. It is hardly worth refuting yet again the feeble excuses for intervention. The humanitarian argument we've all heard before. But what about Kashmir and Sudan, Uganda, Angola, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Algeria? Properly videotaped and "Amanpourized", each would be good for a dozen Kosovos. There was no "genocide", of course. Compared to the killing fields of the third world, Kosovo was an unremarkable low-intensity conflict, uglier perhaps than Northern Ireland a decade ago, but much less so than Kurdistan in our NATO ally Turkey. A total of 2,000 fatalities on all sides in Kosovo until June 1999, in a province of over two million, favourably compares to the annual homicide tally of 450 in Washington, D.C., population 600,000. Counting corpses is poor form, of course, but bearing in mind the brutalities and ethnic cleansing ignored by NATO, or even condoned, notably in Croatia in 1995 or in eastern Turkey, it is clear that Kosovo is not about universal principles. In Washington, Abdullah Ocalan is a terrorist, but the KLA are freedom fighters.

What was it about, then? "Regional stability", we were told next. If we didn't stop the conflict, it would engulf Macedonia, Greece, Turkey, the whole of the Balkans in fact, with much of Europe to follow. But the cure, bombing Serbia into detaching an ethnically pure Albanian Kosovo to the KLA narco-mafia under NATO's benevolent eye, will unleash a chain reaction throughout the ex-communist half of Europe. Its first victim will be the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, where the restive Albanian minority comprises a third of the total population. And will the Pristina model not be demanded by the Hungarians in Romania, where they are more numerous than Kosovo's Albanians, and in southern Slovakia? What will stop the Russians in the Ukraine, Moldova, Estonia, and northern Kazakhstan from following suit, or the Serbs and Croats in the chronically unstable and unviable Dayton Bosnia? And finally, when the Albanians get their secession on the grounds of their numbers, will the same apply when the Latinos in southern California or Texas eventually outnumber their Anglo neighbours and start demanding bilingual statehood leading to reunification with Mexico, and are Russia and China to threaten the U.S. with bombing if Washington doesn't comply?

NATO has won for now, but the west has lost. The war has undermined the very principles that constitute the west, namely the rule of law. The notion of human rights can never provide the basis for either the rule of law or morality. Universal human rights detached from any rootedness in time and place will be open to the latest whim of outrage or the latest fad for victimhood. The misguided effort to transform NATO from a defensive alliance into a mini-UN with out-of-area self-appointed responsibilities is a certain road to more Bosnias, more Kosovos down the line. Now that the "Clintonistas" and NATO were successful in Kosovo, we can expect new and even more dangerous adventures elsewhere, but next time around the Russians, Chinese, Indians, and others will know better than to buy the malarkey about free markets and democratic human rights, and the future of the west in the eventual inevitable conflict may be uncertain. [...]

There can be no doubt that the war NATO was fighting in April and May 1999 was not intended or willed by anything that can be called an "alliance," when the use of force was plotted inside the Beltway in 1998. It is worth asking how far this reacquisition of minor imperial status

by Canada and other NATO members is creating a media-led political process that leaves national decision-making meaningless beyond a formal cheerleading function. It is also worth asking how it came to be that the chief war aim of NATO was keeping the alliance together, what disciplines it implies, and how easily and how bloodily it can be repeated.

The moral absolutism that was invoked by the proponents of intervention as a substitute for rational argument can no longer be sustained. Genuine dilemmas about our human responsibility for one another must not be used to reactivate the viral imperialism of the re-extended west. The more arrogant the new doctrine, the greater the willingness to lie for the truth. To be capable of “doing something” sustains moral self-respect, if we can suppress the thought that we are not so much moral actors as consumers of pre-digested choices.

At the onset of the new millennium, we are living in a virtual coliseum, where exotic and nasty troublemakers can be killed not by lions but by the magical flying machines of the imperium. As the candidates for punishment or martyrdom are pushed into the arena, many denizens of the west react to the show as imperial consumers, not as citizens with a parliamentary right and a democratic duty to question the proceedings.

May the results of your present inquiry prove me wrong. Thank you.

**The Chair:** Thank you, sir. I promise you the present inquiry will not go back to the Peace of Westphalia. I appreciate very much the scholarship of your intervention. [...] What’s your alternative? Mine is there are going to be United States imperial courts applying their jurisdiction around the world to enforce it, so that may be worse for you. Anyway, that’s just a reflection—

**Mr. Srdja Trifkovic:** My alternative is to rediscover the beauty of a society of nations in which enlightened national interests, based upon the golden rule of “I will not deny to anyone what I am asking for myself”, will be the basis of law and the basis of international relations. I am not claiming it is a long-lost golden age, say in Europe between 1815 and 1914, that we ought to yearn for in terms of reactionary nostalgia. I’m simply saying that what we are offered as a replacement in the Blairites’ and Clintonistas’ brave new world is infinitely worse and infinitely more frightening. [...]

The Kosovo crisis is primarily the result of the U.S. involvement in the Kosovo situation. Until the moment Dick Holbrooke decided that this was something they would tackle in a big way, it was, I insist, a low-level, unremarkable conflict, the likes of which we see all over the world all of the time. At the moment there is a whole series of geopolitical reasons why the Washington administration wants to be involved in the Balkans [and] you shouldn’t take humanitarian and other alibis at face value. You should always assume there is an agenda behind it. One of them is to have a U.S. foothold in the European mainland that will not be subject to the ups and downs of the transatlantic relationship. Therefore, if and when the Germans, the French, and others decide to create a European defence structure that will gradually detach west Europeans from NATO and ultimately lead to the closure of U.S. bases in Naples, Frankfurt and Munich, there will be the access in Skopje, in Pristina and in Tuzla that will provide both the political and military presence that will not be affected by such a change in the relationship.

When I say there are geopolitical reasons that have a logic of their own, I am not claiming that in this particular case we can establish a definite sequence of events. I’m simply saying that humanitarian and moralistic claims by themselves are neither a sufficient nor necessary explanation.

In order to look at Kosovo in the longer term, we have to ask the question: what will happen if and when the United States administration, after Clinton or even after whoever comes after Clinton, loses interest in the Balkans? At the moment they’re creating the demand for their

involvement by creating a whole series of small, fragmented and unviable units that, by themselves, have neither the political nor cultural nor historic meaning, such as Dayton-Bosnia, such as Kosovo, such as tomorrow, perhaps, Sanjak, or Montenegro, whichever.

If and when the presence of the underwriters of *Pax Americana* in the Balkans are removed, we will have another bout of Hobbesian free-for-all. And that is the tragedy of it all, because what is being done right now is not the foundation for the revival of solid, just, and durable peace, but just an improvisation on an ad hoc basis that bears no relation to history, no relation to the continuity of political and cultural developments in that part of the world. It satisfies the needs of the moment.

I'm saying this not as someone born in Serbia, but as someone who is trying to look at the political essence of the problem. So far the U.S. administration has followed the principle that all of the ethnic groups in the area can be satisfied at the expense of the Serbs, and the result is a Carthaginian peace imposed upon the Serbian nation that will create a constant source of revengist resentment among the Serbs and a determination to turn the tables once Uncle Sam loses interest. I feel there will be a war the Serbs will fight to return Kosovo to their own rule, because they feel Kosovo has been unjustly detached.

And so whatever scenario people in Brussels, London, Washington, Ottawa, or Bonn decide for Kosovo today will not be worth the paper it's written on if it doesn't bear any relation to the geopolitical realities in the long term, and those realities are fairly simple. You will not be able to impose something called multicultural Kosovo, multi-ethnic Kosovo, if people on the ground—and here I primarily have the Albanians in mind—are determined to have a mono-ethnic Kosovo. By including Serbian membership in any quasi-representative body you introduce, you will not reinvent a multi-ethnic Kosovo.

At the moment, the only way people in Kosovo will feel safe and secure living in their communities is if you have a de facto partition. Whether it is accompanied by a constitutional and political model that will sanctify that partition is neither here nor there. But you have to realize that an imposed Carthaginian peace on the Serb nation that does not take into account the legitimate interests of the Serbs in the longer term, that does not take into account the give and take in which each party will feel it has lost something as well as gained something, will be unviable, unjust, and, in the long term, the source of another conflict. [...]

If this was the war to return the Albanians, or in the memorable words of the then British defence minister, “Serbs out, Albanians back, NATO in”, well, nobody is talking about Serbs back in Kosovo these days. If, as Ms. Augustine mentioned, this was the war to return 700,000 or whatever displaced Albanians, nobody's really talking about a program for the return of a quarter of a million displaced Serbs, non-Albanians, under NATO in the aftermath of NATO's victory...

If we are to re-establish a modicum of reality in this debate, we have to bear in mind that human fallibility and human culpability are not the exclusive prerogative of any one single ethnic group. [...] To claim the Krajina is less of a crime than Srebrenica, even though the Krajina resulted in between 9,000 and 12,000 Serbian deaths, is a very curious argument, both morally and intellectually. But in particular, I find it reprehensible that Kosovo is still referred to as “the massacre”, because the Kosovo massacre is one of the biggest media-mediated political lies of the decade, if not the century. In perspective, when a few decades pass, it will belong to the same category as bayoneted Belgian babies by the kaiser's army in 1914.

(Aussi en français: <http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/committee/362/fait/evidence/ev1039974/faitev21-f.htm>)

#### APPENDIX IV:

#### RECENT STATEMENTS AND ADVISORIES FROM THE AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR KOSOVO

### Unofficial Visit of Agim Ceku to Moscow an Opportunity for a Firm and Conclusive Message Regarding Kosovo's Future

WASHINGTON, DC -- Regarding the unofficial visit to Moscow of so-called "Prime Minister" of the Serbian province of Kosovo, Agim Ceku, the **American Council for Kosovo** submits for the consideration of the Russian government and people, and of international opinion generally, the following:

1. Mr. Ceku's visit to Moscow is not an official one, as confirmed by the Russian Ambassador in Belgrade, nor is his visit on the initiative of Russian authorities. To the contrary, his visit was agreed to by Moscow only after repeated requests from Mr. Ceku himself and, according to press reports, following consultation with Belgrade.
2. Accordingly, Mr. Ceku's visit to Moscow should not be taken as a sign of a shift of Russia's position in favor of Kosovo Albanian demands for the illegal and forcible detachment of Kosovo from Serbia. To the contrary, as stated by State Duma Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Konstantin Kosachyov, the Russian decision finally to agree to Mr. Ceku's request is aimed at "bolstering Serbia's territorial integrity and preventing [an imposed] decision on Kosovo's status."
3. The fact that Russian authorities are even willing to meet at all with a person of Mr. Ceku's odious record is a testament to the extent to which Moscow is determined to consult with all sides of the Kosovo conflict in an effort to reach a just settlement. Mr. Ceku, formerly military commander of the so-called "Kosovo Liberation Army" (KLA), is a terrorist and a war criminal, no better than the late Shamil Basayev and Khattab in Chechnya. According to the 2002 Serbian indictment for genocide and other grievous offenses, Mr. Ceku bears command responsibility for the murders by KLA terrorists of 669 Serbs and 18 members of other ethnic groups, 518 counts of inflicting serious bodily harm (including torture) and wounding, and 584 counts of abduction, many of the victims of which are presumed dead. Mr. Ceku was named military commander of the KLA in May 1999. The following month, *after* the end of hostilities between Serbia and NATO forces, KLA terrorists under Mr. Ceku's command intensified their attacks on civilian Christian Serbs, driving two-thirds of them from the province, as well as against Roma (Gypsies), Croats, Jews, Ashkalis, Gorani, and other non-Muslim or non-Albanians in Kosovo. Over 150 Orthodox Christian churches and monasteries have been demolished or desecrated. Prior to his affiliation with the terrorist KLA, Mr. Ceku was responsible for numerous atrocities in other parts of the former Yugoslavia. (Further background about Mr. Ceku's record and his unfitness to claim leadership of an independent state is available from the **American Council for Kosovo**, specifically the Council's statement of June 19, 2006). <http://www.savekosovo.org/default.asp?p=9&leader=0&sp=73>
4. Mr. Ceku's visit to Moscow comes as Kosovo Albanians and their supporters have launched a desperate diplomatic and public relations blitz in an effort to regain lost momentum in light of the postponement of any decision on Kosovo's final status, once said to be "inevitable" by the end of 2006. Despite claims that independence will be announced soon after Serbia's January 2007 elections, there is no credible expectation that an illegal solution to the Kosovo problem, imposed under threat of terrorist violence from Mr. Ceku and his associates, will be any more viable than it is now.

5. The **American Council for Kosovo** appeals to the Russian government and people to ensure that Mr. Ceku's Moscow visit is used as an opportunity for a firm and conclusive restatement of Russia's principled position: that no solution may be imposed on Serbia without Serbia's agreement or in violation of the United Nations Charter. **The unmistakable reality is that Kosovo independence is off the table.**
6. The prospective failure of Mr. Ceku to secure Russian support for his cause should be seen as an opportunity for the international community to shift decisively to an effort to find a real and lasting solution for Kosovo within a democratic, European state: Serbia. Such a "European solution" for Kosovo, in accordance with the U.N. Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, would address the legitimate needs of all of Kosovo's residents regardless of ethnicity or religion, and would be the product of genuine negotiations – which have yet to begin. It's now time for responsible representatives of Kosovo's Albanian community to step forward to work with Belgrade for such a solution.

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Monday, 9 October 2006

- UN Signals Likely Delay for Kosovo Future Status Decision
- Kosovo Bishop Artemije Outlines Kosovo's Jihad Threat
- Britain's Royal United Services Institute Official Says Independence Drive Stalled
- Pakistan Leader Confirms Existence of Kosovo's Jihad Terror Network
- Muslim Albanian Violence Against Serbs Continues

Editorial comment from the American Council for Kosovo: UN special envoy Martti Ahtisaari signaled a likely delay for a Kosovo future status decision, following increased warnings from the international community on the dangers of Kosovo independence. While Ahtisaari stated that the future status decision delay was due to recently announced elections scheduled in Serbia, increasing pressure from the international community to reach a compromised solution -- not an imposed solution -- is the likely cause of delay. Voices from the Muslim Albanian side are increasingly nervous that a 'temporary' delay may point to uncertainty about the formerly 'inevitable' final status. If the past is any indication, such nervousness is likely to lead to further violence -- the only reason independence is under consideration at all.

The *Southeast European Times* reported: UN special envoy Martti Ahtisaari's suggestion that a decision on Kosovo's status could be postponed has drawn mixed reactions. Kosovo Albanian leaders called for the process to move forward as planned, Kosovo Serbs said a delay could be a feasible option, and the EU's foreign policy and security chief appeared to support Ahtisaari's position. Also reported in the *Southeast European Times* was a discussion between EU foreign policy and security chief Javier Solana and Ahtisaari earlier last week: If a constitutional referendum takes place in Serbia this month and a parliamentary vote is held by the end of the year, a "sound decision" on postponing the status solution would probably be taken, Solana said.

The UN's and EU's pragmatic thinking follows recent statements by international foreign ministers and policy experts on the dangers of Kosovo independence. In a BBC interview, Dr. Jonathan Eyal – director of Britain's Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), one of the most prestigious strategic institutes in the world – stated that "it is good that inadequately discussed proposals which were made in a hurry, will now be analyzed, by way of discussions with Belgrade and contacts in Moscow." Eyal, who has published two studies on the errors committed by the West in handling the Balkan conflict since 1991, also warned the international community of impending possible Albanian violence: "It is key to tell the Albanians that the Kosovo status discussions will be continued, because the Contact Group and Belgrade agree that the status quo

can no longer be maintained, but also offer them a warning that repeating violence from the past is unacceptable and that they will not speed up the process through violent methods.”

Eyal’s comments come on the heels of statements by Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk, who are among a growing number of international diplomats who realize the dangers of Kosovo independence and are warning against any imposed solution deadline against Serbia by the international community. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported: [EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana] told the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee in Brussels today that during a recent phone conversation, Saakashvili had confessed to “tremendous worry” about the possible consequences that ongoing UN-sponsored Kosovo status talks could have for Georgia. During a September 25 speech, Bakoyannis stated: Unfortunately, despite months of negotiations, no concrete progress has been achieved so far. The Serbs appear ready to agree to everything but independence and the Kosovo Albanians to nothing short of independence. Greece believes that we must not risk achieving a long-lasting viable solution for the sake of meeting a preset, arbitrary deadline. International Relations and Security Network reported on September 27: In New York, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk told the UN General Assembly that granting independence to Kosovo could have a ripple effect from the Black Sea to the Caucasus.

Leading international media outlets are also signaling a change in course, from inevitable independence by the end of 2006 to continued talks leading to the highest possible autonomy instead. The *Financial Times* reported on September 23: Diplomats in Washington also see the Bush administration responding to the concerns raised by Russia and Serbia and reassessing their position on Kosovo. *The Economist* reported on changing opinions toward Kosovo independence as well: “The Balkan endgame is starting to look messy. Expectations that Kosovo would be independent by early next year have just suffered a blow... the UN talks on Kosovo under Martti Ahtisaari, a former Finnish president, have gone nowhere... if Kosovo’s Albanians then start fretting that Serbia is successfully outmanoeuvring them, there is a risk that extremists among them will return to violence, which would not do their cause any good.”

This “risk” of violence, as *The Economist* stated, is a reality for Kosovo’s non-Albanians. Each day, Albanian violence against non-Albanians continues under the eye of the international community. On October 6, a UN bus of Serbs was attacked - Beta News Agency reported: The attacks on the bus were regular occurrences on every Tuesday and Friday. Associated Press reported on October 3: An explosion damaged the house of a Gorani minority member in a southern Kosovo village... The explosion caused “considerable material damage” to the house in Rapqe e Nalte village, about 100 kilometers (62 miles) south of capital, Pristina, police spokesman Veton Elshani said. Following the discovery of an arms depot in Kosovo, Montenegrin Mina news agency reported on October 4: “Kfor’s Austrian contingent commander Herbert Pahinger said that the existence of arms depots clearly demonstrates that there are still large amounts of arms and combat equipment around and that Kosovo still remains a potential hotbed of crisis.”

1. During a September 28, 2006 keynote address at the “Reconsidering Kosovo” conference in Washington, DC, His Grace Bishop Artemije stated: A European black hole of corruption and organized crime will only enlarge itself if Kosovo is forcibly detached from Serbia. Kosovo’s failed and corrupt provisional institutions are already led by Muslim Albanian former members of the terrorist organization, the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). KLA terrorists have close ties to the Albanian mafia and these ties will only tighten should independence occur. America’s leadership must ask itself if it really wants a new rogue “state” led by jihad terrorists and criminals. Kosovo’s current so-called “prime minister” is a man who bears command responsibility for the murders by KLA terrorists of 669 Serbs and 18 members of

other ethnic groups, 518 counts of inflicting serious bodily harm – including torture and wounding – and 584 counts of abduction, many of the victims of which are presumed dead. This same man who would lead a forcibly detached Kosovo recently met with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and posed for pictures with her. Why is this man welcomed in Washington and treated as a legitimate statesman when he has yet to face justice for his war crimes? Is it wise for the United States to meet with a terrorist leader during this war against Islamo-Fascism?... The jihad in Kosovo was launched in 1995 at a meeting in Tirana, Albania between Osama Bin Laden and two leaders of the KLA. These two terrorists now regularly meet with Kosovo's so-called "prime minister" to manage criminal rackets. I have come to America to ask for an end to this policy of dealing with KLA terrorists – a policy inherited from the past Administration. As my country Serbia is faced with increasing pressure from these violent terrorists, is it fair to expect the Serbian government to hand over part of its territory to this violent Islamic movement? This Islamic movement within Kosovo is responsible for an intifada against Christians, which has resulted in 220,000 Serbs and non-Albanians being forced to leave Kosovo since 1999 – AFTER the end of the war. In addition, centuries-old churches and monasteries – more than 150 of them – have been destroyed.

2. In an October 5, 2006 *Financial Times* article, "US evangelists 'join campaign to keep Kosovo within Serbia'" Guy Dinmore reported: In an interview with the FT during his third visit to the US this year, Bishop Artemije set out the argument shaping the Serb case - that independence would provide a base for an "extremist Islamic jihad" and endanger the Balkans, Europe and the US. Followers of the puritanical Wahhabi strain of Sunni Islam and al-Qaeda jihadists would be drawn there, he said. Already the province, under UN rule, was the "black hole" of Europe, run by criminal gangs trading in people, guns and drugs, while murderers and desecrators of churches and cemeteries were trying to "eradicate" the Christian community. "It is unbelievable to see the US on one side declaring war on terror around the world and on the other side tolerating it in Kosovo," he said.

3. In October 6, 2006 story, "No solution without agreement" B92 News reported: The Royal United Services Institute official told BBC that the stance of Russia had a crucial effect on the stance of the UN's special envoy Martti Ahtisaari to postpone the status solution because of the anticipated elections in Serbia. He said that it would be naïve to expect that a solution which Serbia does not agree with would not set a dangerous precedent. "I think that it is good that inadequately discussed proposals which were made in a hurry, will now be analyzed, by way of discussions with Belgrade, and with contacts in Moscow." Eyal said.

4. In an October 4, 2006 *Jewish World Review* column, "And that Wasn't Even the Tough Question, Primadonna Bill," Julia Gorin wrote: On page 225 of his new book "In the Line of Fire," Pervez Musharraf writes that it is believed that Omar Sheikh, the mastermind behind reporter Daniel Pearl's kidnapping, "was recruited by the British intelligence agency MI-6. It is said that MI-6 persuaded him to take an active part in demonstrations against Serbian aggression in Bosnia and even sent him to Kosovo to join the jihad." Here we have a Muslim leader admitting what our own leaders will not: that with the U.S.-led mischief in the Balkans, the West was facilitating, supporting and financing a jihad in Europe. Musharraf's statement is consistent with the 9/11 Commission's finding that the "groundwork for a true terrorist network was being laid" in 1990s Bosnia...